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Who Is A Minister? Originalist Deference Expands The Ministerial Exception, Jared C. Huber
Who Is A Minister? Originalist Deference Expands The Ministerial Exception, Jared C. Huber
Notre Dame Law Review
The ministerial exception is a doctrine born out of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment that shields many religious institutions’ employment decisions from review. While the ministerial exception does not extend to all employment decisions by, or employees of, religious institutions, it does confer broad—and absolute—protection. While less controversy surrounds whether the Constitution shields religious institutions’ employment decisions to at least some extent, much more debate surrounds the exception’s scope, and perhaps most critically, which employees fall under it. In other words, who is a "minister" for purposes of the ministerial exception?
Protecting "Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs": Lessons From Mississippi Hb 1523, Lindsay Krout Roberts
Protecting "Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs": Lessons From Mississippi Hb 1523, Lindsay Krout Roberts
Mississippi College Law Review
The United States Supreme Court's revolutionary ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges, which guaranteed marriage equality for homosexual couples in every state, gave life to a new challenge in the area of free exercise of religion: to what extent should persons with religious objections to same-sex marriages be forced to participate in them? Should a Christian baker be legally required to bake a wedding cake for a homosexual marriage to which he or she objects? Must a county clerk with religious objections to homosexual marriage sign a marriage license for a same-sex couple?
In an attempt to pre-empt these types of …
The Ideology Of Press Freedom, Hannah Bloch-Wehba
The Ideology Of Press Freedom, Hannah Bloch-Wehba
Faculty Scholarship
This Article offers a critical account of the law of press freedom. American law and political culture laud the press as an institution that plays a vital role in democracy: guarding against corruption, facilitating self-governance, and advocating for free expression. These democratic functions provide justification for the law of press freedom, which defends the media’s autonomy and shields the press from outside interference.
But the dominant accounts of the press’s democratic role are only partly accurate. The law of press freedom is grounded in large part in journalism’s professional commitments to objectivity, public service, and autonomy. These idealized characterizations, flawed …
Courting Censorship, Philip A. Hamburger
Courting Censorship, Philip A. Hamburger
Faculty Scholarship
Has Supreme Court doctrine invited censorship? Not deliberately, of course. Still, it must be asked whether current doctrine has courted censorship — in the same way one might speak of it courting disaster.
The Court has repeatedly declared its devotion to the freedom of speech, so the suggestion that its doctrines have failed to block censorship may seem surprising. The Court’s precedents, however, have left room for government suppression, even to the point of seeming to legitimize it.
This Article is especially critical of the state action doctrine best known from Blum v. Yaretsky. That doctrine mistakenly elevates coercion …
Roads Not Taken On Affirmative Action, Robert L. Tsai
Roads Not Taken On Affirmative Action, Robert L. Tsai
Faculty Scholarship
The law of affirmative action is a mess. In the short term, legal doctrine is constrained by path dependence, but its long-term future is murkier due to the many unforeseen contingencies. To regain a sense of the possible, this Article looks forward to the future of equality jurisprudence by looking backward. It recovers three roads not taken. First, the Supreme Court could have kept expectations minimal by hewing closely to the methods and rhetoric of fairness rather than ratifying a consumerist model of entitlement by deploying an individualistic vision of equality. Second, the justices might have endorsed a robust right …