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A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Marbury V Madison: The Origins Of Judicial Review, Daniel R. Debutts

James Blair Historical Review

The presented research seeks to further our understanding of the Supreme Court’s formation of judicial review through an historical and game theoretic analysis. Marbury v Madison (1803) has long been hailed as a foundational case in which Chief Justice Marshall outfoxed President Jefferson in a duel of wits. Yet, despite this claim, there are surprisingly few papers that apply modern game-theory to what is widely considered a landmark—and rather iconic—supreme court case. In my paper, I review this notion and, in doing so, come to better understand inter-institutional relationships and their corresponding game theoretic strategies. More importantly, however, I suggest …

Tom Delay: Popular Constitutionalist?, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Judicial Safeguards Of Federalism, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Reanimator: Mark Tushnet And The Second Coming Of The Imperial Presidency, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Tiers Of Scrutiny In A Hierarchical Judiciary, Tara Leigh Grove

Tara L. Grove

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review And Nongeneralizable Cases, Neal Devins, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Inconsistent Standards Of Review In Last Term's Establishment Clause Cases, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Rights Without Remedies: Judicial Review Of Underinclusive Legislation, Bruce K. Miller, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Congressional Factfinding And The Scope Of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

Book Review Of The Second American Revolution, Neal Devins

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The Rhetorical Uses Of Marbury V. Madison: The Emergence Of A "Great Case", Davison M. Douglas

Davison M. Douglas

Marbury v. Madison is today indisputably one of the "great cases" of American constitutional law because of its association with the principle of judicial review. But for much of its history, Marbury has not been regarded as a seminal decision. Between 1803 and 1887, the Supreme Court never once cited Marbury for the principle of judicial review, and nineteenth century constitutional law treatises were far more likely to cite Marbury for the decision's discussion of writs of mandamus or the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction than for its discussion of judicial review. During the late nineteenth century, however, the exercise of …

Understanding The Politics Of Resentment: Of The Principles, Institutions, Counter-Strategies, Normative Change, And The Habits Of Heart, Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

The paper asks, when is a constitutional design of any (domestic, international, supranational) polity in error? On the most general level, such a critical juncture occurs when a polity's founding document (treaty, convention, constitution) protects against dangers that no longer exist or does not protect against the dangers that were not contemplated by the founders. Constitutions not only rule but should also protect against deconstitution. When analyzed together, the cases of Hungary, Poland, South America, and more recently, the United States, suggest a worrying new pattern of the erosion of constitutional democracies. One may even speak of a recipe for …

Judicial Review And Constitutional Interpretation In Afghanistan: A Case Of Inconsistency, Shoaib Timory

Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review

No abstract provided.

Enforcing Principled Constitutional Limits On Federal Power: A Neo-Federalist Refinement Of Justice Cardozo's Jurisprudence, Robert J. Pushaw Jr.

William & Mary Law Review

Since the New Deal of the mid-1930s, Congress has asserted virtually absolute power to (1) “regulate Commerce ... among the States,” (2) tax and spend for the “general Welfare,” and (3) delegate “legislative Power[ ]” to the executive branch. From 1937 until 1994, the Supreme Court rejected every claim that such statutes had exceeded Congress’s Article I authority and usurped the states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment. Over the past quarter century, conservative Justices have tried, and failed, to develop principled constitutional limits on the federal government while keeping the modern administrative and social welfare state largely intact.

The …