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Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.

The President, Foreign Policy, And War Powers: A Survey On The Expansion And Setbacks Of Presidential Power, Michael W. Wilt

Channels: Where Disciplines Meet

How powerful is the President of the United States in the arena of foreign policy? This question has opened many discussions, and hotly contested debates as to the extent of the president’s actual power. To make matters more complicated, the United States’ foreign policy has developed and evolved over the course of the United States’ more than two-hundred years history. These foreign policy concerns and international conflicts have mired the presidency into debates and consistent trials over the constitutional extent of the presidency, specifically concerning presidential war powers. Moreover, the Presidents have varied in their approaches to each of these …

Rules To Impeach By - What It Takes To Remove A President, David Dittfurth

Faculty Articles

Professor David Dittfurth explains the steps that must be taken by Congress to impeach a president or other official.

The White House And Congress Are Heading For A Collision. Who Will Win?, Katherine A. Shaw

Online Publications

With the 116th Congress up and running, President Trump is facing meaningful congressional oversight for the first time. On Monday, the House Judiciary Committee embarked on a major investigative mission, sending letters to 81 witnesses seeking documents and testimony relating to possible “obstruction of justice, public corruption and other abuses of power” by Mr. Trump and his administration.

But the White House shows no signs of rolling over. It has indicated for months that it is prepared to assert the president’s executive privilege to keep congressional investigators from gathering information about Mr. Trump — including his conversations with high-level advisers. …

Strategic Institutional Positioning: How We Have Come To Generate Environmental Law Without Congress, Donald J. Kochan

Texas A&M Law Review

The administrative state has emerged as a pervasive machine that has become the dominate generator of legal rules—despite the fact that the U.S. Constitution commits the legislative power to Congress alone. When examining legislation authorizing administrative agencies to promulgate rules, we are often left asking whether Congress “dele- gates” away its lawmaking authority by giving agencies too much power and discretion to decide what rules should be promulgated and to determine how rich to make their content. If the agencies get broad authority, it is not too hard to understand why they would fulsomely embrace the grant to its fullest. …

John Quincy Adams Influence On Washington’S Farewell Address: A Critical Examination, Stephen Pierce

Undergraduate Research

John Quincy Adams is seen by the American public today as a failed one-term president. When one starts to see his diplomatic work and his service in Congress, however, he becomes one of the most important figures in American history. The diplomatic historian Samuel Flagg Bemis was in 1944 the first historian to suggest that Adams’ early writings influenced Washington’s Farewell Address. He looked through some of Adams’ early published writings and concluded that it was, “Conspicuous among the admonitions of the Farewell Address are: (1) to exalt patriotically the national words, America, American, Americans; (2) to beware of foreign …

The Asylum Makeover: Chevron Deference, The Self-Referral And Review Authority, Jessica Senat

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

"I'M Leavin' It (All) Up To You": Gundy And The (Sort-Of) Resurrection Of The Subdelegation Doctrine, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In 2000, Cass Sunstein quipped that the conventional nondelegation doctrine, which holds that there are judicially enforceable constitutional limits on the extent to which Congress can confer discretion on other actors to determine the content of federal law, “has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”1 The “one good year,” he said, was 1935, when the Court twice held unconstitutional certain provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act that gave the president power to approve or create codes of conduct for essentially all American businesses, subject only to very vague, and often contradictory, statutory exhortations to pursue …

A Computational Analysis Of Constitutional Polarization, David E. Pozen, Eric L. Talley, Julian Nyarko

Faculty Scholarship

This Article is the first to use computational methods to investigate the ideological and partisan structure of constitutional discourse outside the courts. We apply a range of machine-learning and text-analysis techniques to a newly available data set comprising all remarks made on the U.S. House and Senate floors from 1873 to 2016, as well as a collection of more recent newspaper editorials. Among other findings, we demonstrate (1) that constitutional discourse has grown increasingly polarized over the past four decades; (2) that polarization has grown faster in constitutional discourse than in nonconstitutional discourse; (3) that conservative-leaning speakers have driven this …

Evaluating Constitutional Hardball: Two Fallacies And A Research Agenda, Joseph Fishkin, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This Reply addresses the responses by Professors David Bernstein and Jed Shugerman to our essay Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball. Bernstein's response, we argue, commits the common fallacy of equating reciprocity with symmetry: assuming that because constitutional hardball often "takes two" to play, both sides must be playing it in a similar manner. Shugerman's response, on the other hand, helps combat the common fallacy of equating aggressiveness with wrongfulness: assuming that because all acts of constitutional hardball strain norms of governance, all are similarly damaging to democracy. We suggest that whereas Bernstein's approach would set back the burgeoning effort to study constitutional …