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Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman

Articles

Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …

When Do The Ends Justify The Means?: The Role Of The Necessary And Proper Clause In The Commerce Clause Analysis, David Loudon

University of Massachusetts Law Review

This Article discusses the interplay between the Necessary and Proper Clause and the Commerce Clause, particularly in light of the landmark decision of National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius. First, this Article reviews the historical interaction between the two clauses, discussing the instances in which the two may have been considered together, and introducing the Supreme Court jurisprudence of each clause, setting the legal landscape for the NFIB v. Sebelius decision. Next, this Article details the three opinions from the NFIB v. Sebelius decision, Chief Justice Roberts’ holding, the joint concurrence, and Justice Ginsberg’s dissent, specifically as they …

James Madison And The Constitution's "Convention For Proposing Amendments", Robert G. Natelson

Akron Law Review

The last of the limited-subject interstate gatherings is today the most famous. The Annapolis Convention of 1786 was to focus on “the trade and Commerce of the United States.” Its limited scope induced Madison, who served as a delegate, explicitly to distinguish it from a plenipotentiary convention. For the most part, all of these conventions—today we might call them “task forces”—remained within the scope of their calls. If there was an exception, it was the abortive assembly at Annapolis, and that exception was solely to express the “wish” and “opinion” that another convention be held to consider defects in the …

The Sweeping Domestic War Powers Of Congress, Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash

Michigan Law Review

With the Habeas Clause standing as a curious exception, the Constitution seems mysteriously mute regarding federal authority during invasions and rebellions. In truth, the Constitution speaks volumes about these domestic wars. The inability to perceive the contours of the domestic wartime Constitution stems, in part, from unfamiliarity with the multifarious emergency legislation enacted during the Revolutionary War. During that war, state and national legislatures authorized the seizure of property, military trial of civilians, and temporary dictatorships. Ratified against the backdrop of these fairly recent wartime measures, the Constitution, via the Necessary and Proper Clause and other provisions, rather clearly augmented …

Auxiliary Protections: Why The Founders’ Bicameral Congress Depended On Senators Elected By State Legislatures, Vince Eisinger

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Problem Of Presidential Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, John D. Feerick

Fordham Law Review

One of the most critical and intriguing constitutional questions ever presented for solution is: What happens when the President of the United States becomes incapable of discharging the powers and duties of his office? Does the Vice-President "become President" for the remainder of the term or does he merely "act as President" during the period of the inability? The Constitution is not explicit..

Setting Congress Up To Fail, Margaret B. Kwoka

Journal of Race, Gender, and Ethnicity

No abstract provided.

Justice Ginsburg's Call To Action: The Court, Congress, And The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Of 2009, Youlan Xiu

Senior Theses and Projects

No abstract provided.

Party Polarization And Congressional Committee Consideration Of Constitutional Questions, Neal Devins

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

Enforcing The Fifteenth Amendment, Ellen D. Katz

Book Chapters

This chapter examines efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment in the period from United States v. Reese through Shelby County v. Holder. Reese and Shelby County expose the most rigorous stance the Court has employed to review congressional efforts to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, while the years in-between show Congress and the Court working more in tandem, at times displaying remarkable indifference to blatant violations of the Fifteenth Amendment, and elsewhere working cooperatively to help vindicate the Amendment’s promise. Defying simple explanation, this vacillation between cooperation and resistance captures the complex and deeply consequential way concerns about federal power, …

A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig