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Eldred And Lochner: Copyright Term Extension And Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, Paul M. Schwartz, William Michael Treanor Dec 2013

Eldred And Lochner: Copyright Term Extension And Intellectual Property As Constitutional Property, Paul M. Schwartz, William Michael Treanor

Paul M. Schwartz

Since the ratification of the constitution, intellectual property law in the United States has always been, in part, constitutional law. Among the enumerated powers that Article I of the Constitution vests in Congress is the power to create certain intellectual property rights. To a remarkable extent, scholars who have examined the Constitution's Copyright Clause have reached a common position. With striking unanimity, these scholars have called for aggressive judicial review of the constitutionality of congressional legislation in this area. The champions of this position--we refer to them as the IP Restrictors--represent a remarkable array of constitutional and intellectual property scholars. …


The Illusory Eighth Amendment, John F. Stinneford Dec 2013

The Illusory Eighth Amendment, John F. Stinneford

UF Law Faculty Publications

Although there is no obvious doctrinal connection between the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence and its Eighth Amendment excessive punishments jurisprudence, the two are deeply connected at the level of methodology. In both areas, the Supreme Court has been criticized for creating “prophylactic” rules that invalidate government actions because they create a mere risk of constitutional violation. In reality, however, both sets of rules deny constitutional protection to a far greater number of individuals with plausible claims of unconstitutional treatment than they protect.

This dysfunctional combination of over- and underprotection arises from the Supreme Court’s use of implementation rules as a …


The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming Nov 2013

The Inclusiveness Of The New Originalism, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In tracing the arc of originalism from the old originalism to the new, I observe a shift from an exclusionary outlook to an inclusionary outlook, reflected in new originalists’ proclamations that “we are all originalists now.” As my title suggests, I am going to bring out the inclusiveness of the new originalism and ponder its implications. The new originalists have emphasized two developments: (1) the movement from a focus on “intention of the framers” to “original public meaning” and (2) the articulation of and emphasis on the distinction between interpretation and construction. My main points are two. First, the inclusiveness …


The Bill Of Rights And Originalism, Gerard V. Bradley Oct 2013

The Bill Of Rights And Originalism, Gerard V. Bradley

Gerard V. Bradley

Professor Bradley begins the final installment of the University of Illinois Law Review's year-long tribute to the Bill of Rights by proposing that the first ten Amendments, like the Constitution itself, be interpreted according to the original understanding of their ratifiers. Professor Bradley, though, narrows the scope of the exegetical inquiry to what he proposes is the only sound originalism - plain meaning, historically recovered. Professor Bradley argues that interpreting the Bill of Rights according to the text's plain meaning among persons politically active at the time of drafting avoids both the inflexibility and philosophical deficiencies of "snapshot" conservative originalism …


The First Amendment Structure For Speakers And Speech, Charles W. Rhodes Aug 2013

The First Amendment Structure For Speakers And Speech, Charles W. Rhodes

Charles W Rhodes

A noticeable trend in the Roberts Court’s free speech decisions is heightened attention to the dimensions of the First Amendment. From holding false factual statements, violent video games, and depictions of animal cruelty are covered by the First Amendment, to determining that a legislator’s vote, governmental acceptance of a monument, and a law school’s refusal to allow access to military recruiters are not, the Court has highlighted the importance of evaluating both the scope of the First Amendment and the appropriate attribution of communicative efforts. But the Court has failed to announce an overarching structural framework for resolving these prefatory …


Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming Jul 2013

Fit, Justification, And Fidelity In Constitutional Interpretation, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

With this event – a Symposium on Abner Greene’s Against Obligation2 and Michael Seidman’s On Constitutional Disobedience3 – we continue our Boston University Law Review series of symposia on significant recent books in law. The distinctive format is to pick two books that join issue on an important topic, to invite the author of each book to write an essay on the other book, and to invite several Boston University School of Law faculty members to write an essay on one or both books.


How Nfib V. Sebelius Affects The Constitutional Gestalt, Lawrence B. Solum Jun 2013

How Nfib V. Sebelius Affects The Constitutional Gestalt, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The thesis of this essay is that the most important legal effects of the Supreme Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius are likely to be indirect. Sebelius marks a possible shift in what we can call the “constitutional gestalt” regarding the meaning and implications of the so-called “New Deal Settlement.” Before Sebelius, the consensus understanding was that New Deal and Warren Court cases had established a constitutional regime of plenary and virtually unlimited national legislative power under the Commerce Clause (which might be subject to narrow and limited carve outs protective of the core of state sovereignty).

After Sebelius …


Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, James E. Fleming Jun 2013

Are We All Originalists Now? I Hope Not!, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, some have asked: “Are we all originalists now?” My response is: “I hope not!” In the Article, I explain why. But first, I show that there is a trick in the question: Even to pose the question “Are we all originalists now?” suggests that one is presupposing what I shall call “the originalist premise.” To answer the question affirmatively certainly shows that one is presupposing it. The originalist premise is the assumption that originalism, rightly conceived, is the best, or indeed the only, conception of fidelity in constitutional interpretation. Put more strongly, it is the assumption that …


The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming Apr 2013

The New Originalist Manifesto, James E. Fleming

Faculty Scholarship

Lawrence B. Solum and Robert W. Bennett's excellent book, Constitutional Originalism: A Debate, calls to mind a famous book in political philosophy, J.J.C. Smart and Bernard Williams's Utilitarianism: For and Against.' Both works pair two spirited yet fair-minded scholars in a constructive debate between two competing views prevalent in their fields. Originalism has a reasonable, programmatic, and inclusive proponent in Solum, and living constitutionalism has a capable, pragmatic, and effective champion in Bennett.


Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel Apr 2013

Jack Balkin's Rich Historicism And Diet Originalism: Health Benefits And Risks For The Constitutional System, Neil S. Siegel

Michigan Law Review

Jack Balkin's Living Originalism is a sweet read. It is beautifully written, illuminating, and provocative. It is conducive to deep reflection about foundational questions. In the book, Balkin reasons from two points of view - the perspective of the constitutional system as a whole and the perspective of the faithful participant in that system (p. 130). First, he provides a systemic account of constitutional change, which he calls "living constitutionalism." Second, he offers an approach to constitutional interpretation and construction, which he calls "framework originalism." These two components-living constitutionalism and framework originalism - together constitute his overall theory of "living …


Construction And Constraint: Discussion Of Living Originalism, Lawrence B. Solum Mar 2013

Construction And Constraint: Discussion Of Living Originalism, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Jack Balkin's Living Originalism raises many important questions about contemporary constitutional theory. Can and should liberals and progressives embrace originalism? Can the New Deal expansion of national legislative power be given originalist foundations? Is there a plausible originalist case for a right to reproductive autonomy and hence for the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade? Is the fact of theoretical disagreement among originalists evidence for the thesis that the originalist project is in disarray?


Towards A Borgean Theory Of Constitutional Interpretation, Marco Jimenez Jan 2013

Towards A Borgean Theory Of Constitutional Interpretation, Marco Jimenez

Pepperdine Law Review

This Article presents a reworking of Jorge Luis Borges’ short story, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, as applied to the U.S. Constitution. In Borges’ original story, which deals with important issues governing interpretation, the creation of meaning, and the ascertainment of original intent, Borges’ fictional scholar, Pierre Menard, undertakes to translate Cervantes’ Don Quixote for a modern audience by creating a Quixote that could have been written by Cervantes today. To do so, Menard begins by immersing himself in the world of 17th century Spain, much as an originalist today might immerse him or herself in 18th century America, …


What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, And The Case Of Originalism, Christopher J. Peters Jan 2013

What Lies Beneath: Interpretive Methodology, Constitutional Authority, And The Case Of Originalism, Christopher J. Peters

All Faculty Scholarship

It is a remarkable fact of American constitutional practice that we cannot agree on a methodology of constitutional interpretation. What can explain our disagreement? Is it the product of a deeper, principled dispute about the meaning of constitutional law? Or is it just a veneer – a velvet curtain obscuring what is really a back-room brawl over political outcomes?

This Article suggests that these, in essence, are the only viable possibilities. Either we disagree about interpretation because we disagree (or are confused) about constitutional authority – about why the Constitution binds us in the first place; or we disagree because …


2nd Amendment: The Right To Keep & Bear Arms -- Teaching D.C. V. Heller, Corey A. Ciocchetti Jan 2013

2nd Amendment: The Right To Keep & Bear Arms -- Teaching D.C. V. Heller, Corey A. Ciocchetti

Corey A Ciocchetti

The D.C. v. Heller case is an incredible vehicle to teach about the United States Constitution. The case revolves around the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms and shines a spotlight on Originalism as a theory of Constitutional interpretation. These slides show how the case evolved from the District Court to the Supreme Court. They also teach the facts of the case and the different opinions on both sides of the debate. In the end, readers will learn a great deal about the Second Amendment and its application to federal and state/local gun control laws as well as …


Reforming Affirmative Action For The Future: A Constitutional And Consequentialist Approach, Quinn Chasan Jan 2013

Reforming Affirmative Action For The Future: A Constitutional And Consequentialist Approach, Quinn Chasan

CMC Senior Theses

In my analysis of affirmative action policy, I began the search without having formed any opinion whatsoever. The topic was interesting to me, and after reading a mass of news editorials and their op-eds, I decided to take up the argument for myself. Other than the fact that I am a student, I have no stake in affirmative action policy. This paper relies primarily on the foremost half-dozen or so notable mismatch theory scholars, a close reading of an innumerable number of Supreme Court opinions, affirmative action related studies from higher education academics and policy institutes, and how historical executive …


Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, Stephanos Bibas Jan 2013

Justice Kennedy's Sixth Amendment Pragmatism, Stephanos Bibas

All Faculty Scholarship

This essay, written as part of a symposium on the evolution of Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence, surveys three areas of criminal procedure under the Sixth Amendment: sentence enhancements, the admissibility of hearsay, and the regulation of defense counsel’s responsibilities. In each area, Justice Kennedy has been a notable voice of pragmatism, focusing not on bygone analogies to the eighteenth century but on a hard-headed appreciation of the twenty-first. He has shown sensitivity to modern criminal practice, prevailing professional norms, and practical constraints, as befits a Justice who came to the bench with many years of private-practice experience. His touchstone is not …


Welcome To The New Originalism: A Comment On Jack Balkin’S Living Originalism, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2013

Welcome To The New Originalism: A Comment On Jack Balkin’S Living Originalism, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In this short piece for a symposium on Jack Balkin's new book, Living Originalism, I welcome Jack Balkin into the originalist camp. I discuss how and why a nonoriginalist can become an originalist. By discussing how I eventually became an originalist at the end of the last century, I hope to shed some light on what exactly is so remarkable about Jack Balkin’s move. After discussing the appeal of the New Originalism that account for Balkin's originalist move, I conclude by offering a cautionary note about the use of "underlying principles in Balkin's "text and principle" approach, which in certain …


The Gravitational Force Of Originalism, Randy E. Barnett Jan 2013

The Gravitational Force Of Originalism, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In part I of this essay, prepared for the Fordham conference on “The New Originalism and Constitutional Law,” I describe four aspects of the New Originalism: (1) The New Originalism is about identifying the original public meaning of the Constitution rather than the original framers intent; (2) The interpretive activity of identifying the original public meaning of the text is a purely descriptive empirical inquiry; (3) But there is also a normative tenet of the New Originalism that contends that the original public meaning of the text should be followed; (4) Distinguishing between the activities of interpretation and construction identifies …


Communicative Content And Legal Content, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2013

Communicative Content And Legal Content, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This essay investigates a familiar set of questions about the relationship between legal texts (e.g., constitutions, statutes, opinions, orders, and contracts) and the content of the law (e.g., norms, rules, standards, doctrines, and mandates). Is the original meaning of the constitutional text binding on the Supreme Court when it develops doctrines of constitutional law? Should statutes be given their plain meaning or should judges devise statutory constructions that depart from the text to serve a purpose? What role should default rules play in the interpretation and construction of contracts? This essay makes two moves that can help lawyers and legal …


Pathetic Argument In Constitutional Law, Jamal Greene Jan 2013

Pathetic Argument In Constitutional Law, Jamal Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Pathetic argument, or argument based on pathos, persuades by appealing to the emotions of the reader or listener. In Aristotle's classic treatment, it exists in parallel to logical argument, which appeals to deductive or inductive reasoning, and ethical argument, which appeals to the character of the speaker. Pathetic argument is common in constitutional law, as in other practical discourse-think of "Poor Joshua!"- but existing accounts of constitutional practice do not provide resources for understanding the place of and limitations upon such appeals when they appear in judicial opinions. This Article begins to fill that gap. Pathetic argument is one of …


Originalism And The Unwritten Constitution, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 2013

Originalism And The Unwritten Constitution, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

In his book, America’s Unwritten Constitution, Akhil Reed Amar contends that to properly engage the written Constitution, scholars and laymen alike must look to extratextual sources: among them America’s founding documents, institutional practices, and ethos, all of which constitute Amar’s “unwritten Constitution.” In this article, the author argues that contemporary originalist constitutional theory is consistent with reliance on extraconstitutional sources in certain circumstances. He establishes a framework for revaluating the use of extratextual sources. That framework categorizes extratextual sources and explains their relevance to constitutional interpretation (the meaning of the text) and constitutional construction (elaboration of constitutional doctrine and …


The Constitution As If Consent Mattered, Tom W. Bell Dec 2012

The Constitution As If Consent Mattered, Tom W. Bell

Tom W. Bell

Libertarians do not fit into the left-right spectrum very comfortably; by their own account, they transcend it. This brief paper, written for a Chapman Law Review symposium on libertarian legal theory, argues that libertarians should likewise transcend the dichotomy currently dividing constitutional theory. The Left tends to regard the Constitution as adaptable to current needs and defined by judicial authority; the Right tends to search the historical record for the Constitution’s original meaning. Each of those conventional approaches has its own virtues and vices. Combining the best of both — the responsiveness of living constitutionalism and the textual fidelity of …


Originalism & Same-Sex Marriage, Grant R. Darwin Dec 2012

Originalism & Same-Sex Marriage, Grant R. Darwin

Grant R Darwin

Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has repeatedly asserted that same-sex marriage is an easy question for originalism; it is clearly not within the Constitution’s purview. The purpose of this Article is to challenge that claim by illustrating how an originalist could find that denying same-sex marriage contravenes the original public meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. It seeks first to ascertain the original public meaning of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Article finds that Section One may serve as a prohibition on systems of caste and class legislation or alternatively as a ban on partial or special class legislation …