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Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, Ann Woolhandler, Caleb Nelson
Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, Ann Woolhandler, Caleb Nelson
Michigan Law Review
According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Constitution limits not only the types of matters that federal courts can adjudicate, but also the parties who can bring those matters before them. In particular, the Court has held that private citizens who have suffered no concrete private injury lack standing to ask federal courts to redress diffuse harms to the public at large. When such harms are justiciable at all, the proper party plaintiff is the public itself, represented by an authorized officer of the government. Although the Court claims historical support for these ideas, academic critics insist that the law …
Recalibrating Justiciability In Ohio Courts, Michael E. Solimine
Recalibrating Justiciability In Ohio Courts, Michael E. Solimine
Cleveland State Law Review
The term "separation of powers" does not appear in either the United States or Ohio Constitutions, but the concept has important implications for the adjudication of rights under both documents. In federal courts, litigants must possess certain characteristics, summarized under the rubric of "standing," to pursue such cases. To have standing, litigants traditionally must have suffered a concrete and ripe injury that was the result of the allegedly unlawful conduct. And even when those criteria are satisfied, cases that call for "political questions" to be resolved can be dismissed by federal judges. These limits to federal court authority are drawn …
The Law Of Words: Standing, Environment, And Other Contested Terms, David N. Cassuto
The Law Of Words: Standing, Environment, And Other Contested Terms, David N. Cassuto
Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000), exposes fundamental incoherencies within environmental standing doctrine, even while it ostensibly makes standing easier to prove for plaintiffs in environmental citizen suits. According to Laidlaw, an environmental plaintiff needs only to show personal injury to satisfy Article III's standing requirement; she need not show that the alleged statutory violation actually harms the environment. This Article argues that Laidlaw's distinction between injury to the plaintiff and harm to the environment is nonsensical. Both the majority and dissent in Laidlaw incorrectly assume that there exists an objective …