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Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt Sep 2019

Congress, The Court, And The Constitution: Hearing Before The Subcommittee On The Constitution Of The Committee On The Judiciary, House Of Representatives, One Hundred Fifth Congress, Second Session, Charles T. Canady, Robert C. Scott, Louis Fisher, David P. Currie, Neal Devins, Neil Kinkopf, Nadine Strossen, Matthew J. Franck, Robert L. Clinton, Henry J. Hyde, Melvin L. Watt

Neal E. Devins

No abstract provided.


Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs Oct 2017

Bush, Obama And Beyond: Observations On The Prospect For Fact Checking Executive Department Threat Claims Before The Use Of Force, Leslie Gielow Jacobs

Leslie Gielow Jacobs

This piece looks at the recurring problem of inflated threat claims offered by executive branch actors to persuade the Nation to consent to the use of force. It sets out the experience of the Bush Administration’s use of incorrect threat claims to persuade the country to consent to the use of force in Iraq as a backdrop to evaluating the President Obama’s use of threat claims to support the continuing use of force in Afghanistan. Although comparison of threat advocacy by the Bush and Obama administrations must be imperfect, it allows for some observations about the extent to which the …


The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky Jun 2017

The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky

Erwin Chemerinsky

[Excerpt] "When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity. Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these changes. Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most significant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme Court’s revival of federalism as a …


The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia Aug 2016

The Political Branches And The Law Of Nations, Bradford R. Clark, Anthony J. Bellia

Anthony J. Bellia

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the U.S. Supreme Court went out of its way to follow background rules of the law of nations, particularly the law of state-state relations. As we have recently argued, the Court followed the law of nations because adherence to such law preserved the constitutional prerogatives of the political branches to conduct foreign relations and decide momentous questions of war and peace. Although we focused primarily on the extent to which the Constitution obligated courts to follow the law of nations in the early republic, the explanation we offered rested on an important, …


A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig Dec 2014

A Quantum Congress, Jorge R. Roig

Jorge R Roig

This article tries to address the problem of a corrupt and broken electoral system that has been captured by special interests through big money spending in political campaigns, while at the same time preserving the spirit of the Free Speech Clause of our Constitution. In doing so, this article first reviews and summarizes the different alternatives proposed as potential fixes for the campaign finance problem. It then explains why none of the proposed alternatives can accomplish the dual goals set out above. Finally, the article briefly sketches a proposal for a fundamental reworking of our representative democracy by substituting legislative …


The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz Dec 2014

The Unconstitutionality Of The Filibuster, Josh Chafetz

Josh Chafetz

This Article, written for the Connecticut Law Review's 2010 "Is Our Constitutional Order Broken?" symposium, argues that the filibuster, as currently practiced, is unconstitutional.

After a brief introduction in Part I, Part II describes the current operation of the filibuster. Although the filibuster is often discussed in terms of "unlimited debate," this Part argues that its current operation is best understood in terms of a sixty-vote requirement to pass most bills and other measures through the Senate.

Part III presents a structural argument that this supermajority requirement for most Senate business is unconstitutional. This Part argues that the words "passed" …


Interpreting Acronyms And Epithets: Examining The Jurisprudential Significance (Or Lack Thereof), Brian Christopher Jones Feb 2014

Interpreting Acronyms And Epithets: Examining The Jurisprudential Significance (Or Lack Thereof), Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

Given the rise in short title sophistication and their prominent use as evidence in U.S. v. Windsor, this essay argues that acronym short titles are a relatively unexplored interpretive phenomenon. Examining how acronyms should be approached in jurisprudence, the essay further explains how many titles are designed around a symbolic epithet, thus calling into question the interpretative value of such titles. Additionally, the essay touches on the recent NY and D.C. decisions regarding the NSA’s bulk telephony metadata collection system, and how the USA PATRIOT acronym may have played a symbolic (psycholinguistic) role.


Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley Nov 2013

Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, William K. Kelley

William K. Kelley

This article criticizes the cardinal rule of statutory construction known as the avoidance canon - that statutes must be interpreted to avoid raising serious constitutional questions - as failing to respect the proper constitutional roles of both Congress and the Executive. It argues that the avoidance canon in practice cannot be grounded in legislative supremacy, which is the common justification for it offered by the Supreme Court, because it assumes without foundation that Congress would always prefer not to come close to the constitutional line in enacting statutes. Instead, the avoidance canon creates pressure for courts to adopt statutory meanings …


A Twentieth Amendment Parable, John C. Nagle Nov 2013

A Twentieth Amendment Parable, John C. Nagle

John Copeland Nagle

The twentieth amendment receives virtually no attention in modern American constitutional law. Adopted in 1933, the primary purpose of the amendment was to eliminate lame-duck Congresses. The proponents of the amendment argued that lame-ducks were subject to nefarious influences and that allowing lame-duck legislation contradicted the voice of the people in the most recent election. But the text of the twentieth amendment simply moved the date on which the newly elected President and Congress took office from March to January, and does not expressly prohibit lame-duck legislation. The framers of the amendment could not conceive of Congress meeting during the …


Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris Oct 2013

Book Review Of Arnold H. Leibowitz, An Historical-Legal Analysis Of The Impeachments Of Presidents Andrew Johnson, Richard Nixon, And William Clinton: Why The Process Went Wrong, Jeffrey B. Morris

Jeffrey B. Morris

No abstract provided.


Fiduciary Principles And Statutory Form In Relation To The Necessary And Proper Clause: Potential Constitutional Implications For Congressional Short Titles, Brian Christopher Jones Dec 2011

Fiduciary Principles And Statutory Form In Relation To The Necessary And Proper Clause: Potential Constitutional Implications For Congressional Short Titles, Brian Christopher Jones

Brian Christopher Jones

This article explores the principles of fiduciary duty and statutory form in relation to the “proper” portion of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and especially in regard to congressional short titles for bills and laws. While the clause is one of the most influential and controversial constitutional phrases, its meaning remains shrouded in mystery. At some level amongst the founders, the Constitution was regarded as a grant of fiduciary duty from the government to its people; given this, the clause should be read from such a perspective, and the duties of loyalty and good faith, among others, come into play …


Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions: (October 2001 Term), Martin A. Schwartz Jun 2011

Supreme Court Section 1983 Decisions: (October 2001 Term), Martin A. Schwartz

Martin A. Schwartz

No abstract provided.


A Read-The-Bill Rule For Congress, Hanah Volokh Dec 2010

A Read-The-Bill Rule For Congress, Hanah Volokh

Hanah M. Volokh

In this Article, I argue that legislators have a duty to read the text of proposed legislation before voting to enact it. A Read the Bill political movement has formed in response to recent high-profile instances of rushed legislation. Putting aside partisan concerns, a rushed legislative process creates real problems because it forces legislators to vote on bills without having the time to properly evaluate the new legal rules that are being imposed on citizens If a rule or norm of reading the bill can slow the legislative process enough to provide for thorough consideration of proposed legislation, it would …


Lawmakers As Lawbreakers, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov Nov 2010

Lawmakers As Lawbreakers, Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

Dr. Ittai Bar-Siman-Tov

How would Congress act in a world without judicial review? Canlawmakers be trusted to police themselves? This Article examinesCongress’s capacity and incentives to enforce upon itself “the law ofcongressional lawmaking”—a largely overlooked body of law that iscompletely insulated from judicial enforcement. The Article exploresthe political safeguards that may motivate lawmakers to engage inself-policing and rule-following behavior. It identifies the majorpolitical safeguards that can be garnered from the relevant legal,political science, political economy, and social psychology scholarship,and evaluates each safeguard by drawing on a combination oftheoretical, empirical, and descriptive studies about Congress. TheArticle’s main argument is that the political safeguards that …


Congress' Power Is Properly Vested, Alan E. Garfield Feb 2010

Congress' Power Is Properly Vested, Alan E. Garfield

Alan E Garfield

No abstract provided.


Congressional Immunity Grants And Separation Of Powers: Legislative Vetoes Of Federal Prosecutions, Hanah M. Volokh Aug 2007

Congressional Immunity Grants And Separation Of Powers: Legislative Vetoes Of Federal Prosecutions, Hanah M. Volokh

Hanah M. Volokh

Congressional investigations can derail criminal prosecutions. The most famous example is the failure of the prosecution of Oliver North for his role in the Iran-Contra scandal after he testified at a congressional committee hearing about his conduct. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that much of the evidence being used in the prosecution was tainted by association with North's compelled congressional testimony and could not be used at trial.

The knowledge that congressional investigations and grants of immunity can create problems for prosecutors has not stopped either the investigations or the immunity grants. Recently, Congress granted immunity to a …


The Path To (And From?) Judicial Independence (Reviewing Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts And Congress Collide: The Struggle For Control Of America’S Judicial System (2006), Robert C. Power Jan 2007

The Path To (And From?) Judicial Independence (Reviewing Charles Gardner Geyh, When Courts And Congress Collide: The Struggle For Control Of America’S Judicial System (2006), Robert C. Power

Robert C Power

No abstract provided.