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The Nsa Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis Of Congressional Oversight During An Era Of One-Party Rule, Tara M. Sugiyama, Marisa Perry
The Nsa Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis Of Congressional Oversight During An Era Of One-Party Rule, Tara M. Sugiyama, Marisa Perry
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it revealed that, in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks, President George W Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantless surveillance on individuals to unearth nascent terrorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties. This Note argues that when a single party controls both the executive and the legislative branches, the fire-alarm model fails to provide sufficient congressional oversight. Short of future elections altering the balance …
Model Continuity Of Congress Statute, Seth Barrett Tillman
Model Continuity Of Congress Statute, Seth Barrett Tillman
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] "Although, the reasoning of Chadha arguably extends to actions taken pursuant to this Model Statute, the facts of any litigation arising from this Model Statute are substantially different from the facts of Chadha. Unlike Chadha, all orders, resolutions, and votes made pursuant to this Model Statute are presented. Any litigation arising under this Model Statute will permit lower courts to take a fresh look at Chadha’s bicameralism rationale apart from the presentment issues, which are not at play under the terms of this statute. "
Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg
Irrational War And Constitutional Design: A Reply To Professors Nzelibe And Yoo, Paul F. Diehl, Tom Ginsburg
Michigan Journal of International Law
This Reply proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the argument of the Nzelibe and Yoo paper. Part II considers their principal-agent analysis in the context of the American political system. Part III elaborates on the "democratic peace" literature, demonstrating that it does not support the conclusions that they draw. Part IV addresses the argument that we are in a new strategic situation, such that old rules ought not apply. Part V concludes.
Naked Came I: Jurisdiction-Stripping And The Constitutionality Of House Bill 3313, Jason J. Salvo
Naked Came I: Jurisdiction-Stripping And The Constitutionality Of House Bill 3313, Jason J. Salvo
Seattle University Law Review
In his law review article, Professor Henry Hart responded to the questions of whether Congress had unlimited control of federal jurisdiction and whether this control was consistent with other provisions in the Constitution. Though Professor Hart's article has been widely debated, his overarching thesis is generally accepted: Congress' power to restrict Supreme Court jurisdiction is bound by the requirement that the Court's “essential functions” may not be trammeled, but Congress' power to restrict lower federal court jurisdiction is broad. This Comment will build on Professor Hart's thesis, arguing that the essential functions of the federal judiciary are broader than what …
Reconceptualizing Federalism, Erwin Chemerinsky
The Future Of Federalism? Pierce County V. Guillen As A Case Study, Lynn A. Baker
The Future Of Federalism? Pierce County V. Guillen As A Case Study, Lynn A. Baker
NYLS Law Review
No abstract provided.