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Evil History: Protecting Our Constitution Through An Anti-Originalism Canon Of Constitutional Interpretation, Michael S. Lewis Mar 2020

Evil History: Protecting Our Constitution Through An Anti-Originalism Canon Of Constitutional Interpretation, Michael S. Lewis

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

This review assesses three recent books on the subject of originalism. Each approaches the question of originalism from a different angle. None of the books confronts the raw challenge to the authority of the framers leveled by Justice Thurgood Marshall in his speech upon the bicentennial of the United States Constitution. Marshall argued that the founding generation was too morally compromised, too bereft of information we now have as a result of the existence and experiences of millions of Americans since the close of the 18th century, and too imperfect in their efforts to design a sustainable government, to justify …


Competing Accounts Of Interpretation And Practical Reasoning In The Debate Over Originalism, André Leduc Nov 2017

Competing Accounts Of Interpretation And Practical Reasoning In The Debate Over Originalism, André Leduc

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

This article explores two assumptions about constitutional law and the form of practical reasoning inherent in constitutional argument and decision that have shaped the debate over originalism. The first assumption—adopted by originalists—is that constitutional reasoning is a formalistic process. Originalism’s critics tacitly describe a very different and less formalistic model. The second assumption—shared by originalists and most of its critics alike—is that the central task of constitutional decision is to interpret the Constitution. Both of these assumptions are wrong. Constitutional argument is not, and cannot be, reduced to the formal model of reasoning tacitly employed in originalism. The critics of …


Why I So Enjoyed Learning With And From Calvin Massey, Vikram David Amar Feb 2017

Why I So Enjoyed Learning With And From Calvin Massey, Vikram David Amar

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “I am pleased and proud to participate in this tribute to Calvin Massey, with whom I had the pleasure to work and play for about two decades. When I think of Calvin—and I think of him often—I think of a generous friend, a gregarious colleague and a genuinely good man. He possessed many admirable traits, but today I want to focus on three: (1) his breadth; (2) his independent mind; and (3) his thoughtfulness.”


The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections On Calvin Massey’S Standing In State Courts, State Law, And Federal Review, John M. Greabe Feb 2017

The Asymmetry Problem: Reflections On Calvin Massey’S Standing In State Courts, State Law, And Federal Review, John M. Greabe

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

This paper is based on remarks delivered at a symposium to honor my University of New Hampshire School of Law colleague Calvin Massey, who passed away in the fall of 2015. The paper discusses an asymmetry in federal standing law. The asymmetry lies in the fact that, when a state’s highest court decides the merits of a federal claim brought in circumstances where the claimant has standing under state law but not federal law, the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decision only if the state supreme court upholds the federal claim. This asymmetry was the subject …


Taking Stock: Why The Supreme Court’S Decision To Apply The Market-Value Standard In Horne Ii Further Complicates The Just Compensation Requirement, Greg Seidner Nov 2016

Taking Stock: Why The Supreme Court’S Decision To Apply The Market-Value Standard In Horne Ii Further Complicates The Just Compensation Requirement, Greg Seidner

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause does not prevent the federal (or a state) government from taking private property. It merely sets as a condition that the government pay the owner “just compensation” for the taking. Precisely what constitutes just compensation, however, is a tricky matter. One method for determining just compensation is the “market-value” method, which requires the government to pay the owner the property’s market value. But where a taking is only partial, that is, where the government takes only a portion of private property, the property that remains with the owner may see an increase or decrease in …


Incitement, Threats, And Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment Protections Pre- And Post-Elonis, Mark Strasser Feb 2016

Incitement, Threats, And Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment Protections Pre- And Post-Elonis, Mark Strasser

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "While the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the freedom of expression, individuals issuing threats or advocating illegal conduct may be subject to punishment. What constitutes proscribable speech has long been evolving, and the recent jurisprudence suggests that First Amendment protections are more robust for advocacy of illegal conduct than for threats. Elonis v. United States provided the Court with a golden opportunity to clarify First Amendment threat jurisprudence; however, those hoping for an illuminating analysis cannot help but be disappointed. Part I of this Article discusses the developing First Amendment jurisprudence regarding the regulation of incitement, …


The Divergence Of Modern Jurisprudence From The Original Intent For Federalist And Tenth Amendment Limitations On The Treaty Power, Steven T. Voigt Jan 2014

The Divergence Of Modern Jurisprudence From The Original Intent For Federalist And Tenth Amendment Limitations On The Treaty Power, Steven T. Voigt

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “That the federal treaty-making authority is constrained by the other parts of the Constitution does not sound like the stuff of law journals. It seems like common sense. After all, we would not expect someone to argue that the ability to “regulate Commerce” entitles Congress to disregard the Third Amendment and quarter soldiers in our houses. We would not expect to see an argument that the power to “establish Post Offices” enables Congress to disregard the freedom of the press in the First Amendment. So, why is the Tenth Amendment so fully disregarded with respect to treaties?”


Finding The Original Meaning Of American Criminal Procedure Rights: Lessons From Reasonable Doubt’S Development, Randolph N. Jonakait Mar 2012

Finding The Original Meaning Of American Criminal Procedure Rights: Lessons From Reasonable Doubt’S Development, Randolph N. Jonakait

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The prosecution must prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt for a valid conviction. The Constitution nowhere explicitly contains this requirement, but the Supreme Court in In re Winship1 stated that due process commands it. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, noted that the Court had often assumed that the standard existed, that it played a central role in American criminal justice by lessening the chances of mistaken convictions, and that it was essential for instilling community respect in criminal enforcement. The reasonable doubt standard is fundamental because it makes guilty verdicts more difficult. As Winship …


A Machine Made Of Words: Our Incompletely Theorized Constitution, Gregory Brazeal May 2011

A Machine Made Of Words: Our Incompletely Theorized Constitution, Gregory Brazeal

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt]”Many scholars have observed that the Constitution of the United States can be understood as an example of what Cass Sunstein calls an “incompletely theorized agreement.” The Constitution contains a number of extremely general terms, such as “liberty,” “necessary and proper,” and “due process.” The Framers of the Constitution, it is suggested, did not attempt to specify precisely how each of these principles would operate in every case. On this view, the Constitution is incompletely theorized in the sense of representing “a comfortable and even emphatic agreement on a general principle, accompanied by sharp disagreement about particular cases.” For example, …


State V. Burgess: A Limitation On A Defendant’S Right To Remain Innocent, Elizabeth Lahey Feb 2010

State V. Burgess: A Limitation On A Defendant’S Right To Remain Innocent, Elizabeth Lahey

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “This note will explore the current state of the privilege against self-incrimination, particularly in regard to whether it works to bar negative inferences from being drawn from a defendant’s silence during sentencing in order to determine his remorse for the crime of which he has been convicted. I will focus primarily on the issue in the context of the recent New Hampshire case State v. Burgess. In that case, the court recognized the application of the privilege at sentencing, but nonetheless carved out a unique exception which made negative inferences permissible at sentencing when the defendant has admitted to …


The Supreme Courts: Did September 11th Accelerate Their Sanctioning The Constitutionality Of Criminalizing Suspicion?, Dannye Holley Dec 2008

The Supreme Courts: Did September 11th Accelerate Their Sanctioning The Constitutionality Of Criminalizing Suspicion?, Dannye Holley

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

“This article evaluates whether the nation‘s highest appellate courts have, on balance, been more willing to acquiesce to criminalization based on suspicion since the attacks on the World Trade Center seven years ago. The article seeks to accomplish this evaluation by comparing decisions of the United States and state supreme courts in the six years prior to September 2001 with decisions in the six years following the terrorist attack— have the courts with the greatest authority to sanction the criminalization of suspicion been more willing to do just that? Such a post-September 11th trend would be significant because, despite the …


Completely Unguided Discretion: Admitting Non-Statutory Aggravating And Non-Statutory Mitigating Evidence In Capital Sentencing Trials, Sharon Turlington Mar 2008

Completely Unguided Discretion: Admitting Non-Statutory Aggravating And Non-Statutory Mitigating Evidence In Capital Sentencing Trials, Sharon Turlington

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “As an attorney practicing exclusively in the area of death penalty defense at the trial level for the last ten years, my perspective on the problems inherent in the system seems vastly different from that presented in academic research and even in case law. While most of the recent changes in death penalty law have focused on the right of the defendant to have sentencing enhancing elements of an offense proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, much of the evidence presented in an actual death penalty jury trial is non-statutory aggravation and non-statutory mitigation. Generally, non-statutory aggravating …


Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment Became Illegal In America—A Future History, Jur. Eric Engle Ph.D. Mar 2008

Death Is Unconstitutional: How Capital Punishment Became Illegal In America—A Future History, Jur. Eric Engle Ph.D.

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “A constitution is an organic fact of every state: it is a part of the being of the state. People, like the state, also have a constitution—a character. Just as people change over time, so do states. But just as there are natural limits on what people can or cannot become, so there are natural limits on what the state can and cannot fairly do. No man, nor any group of men, ex ante may justly take the life of another person, though perhaps their killing may be excused (or forgiven) ex post.”

"The death of Death would surely …


A Wolf In Sheep’S Clothing: The Unilateral Executive And The Separation Of Powers, Thomas J. Cleary Dec 2007

A Wolf In Sheep’S Clothing: The Unilateral Executive And The Separation Of Powers, Thomas J. Cleary

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “The United States Constitution vests all executive powers in a president. This is the unitary executive theory. By virtue of this, many believe the president is vested with the power to act unilaterally. This is the unilateral executive theory. However, the unilateral executive portends more than action. In reality, the unilateral executive theory provides an opportunity to implement a unilateral agenda. Thus, the aim of this paper is to consider executive power, the separation of powers, and the unilateral executive theory to determine if presidential power under the separation of powers doctrine is actually “a wolf in sheep’s clothing.” …


Human Zoning: The Constitutionality Of Sex-Offender Residency Restrictions As Applied To Post-Conviction Offenders, Ryan Hawkins Jan 2007

Human Zoning: The Constitutionality Of Sex-Offender Residency Restrictions As Applied To Post-Conviction Offenders, Ryan Hawkins

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[H]igh recidivism rates shows that the threat of jail time alone is not sufficient to curb sex crimes. With this in mind, legislators sought to find other ways that would protect potential victims. Community notification laws were the first policy to be implemented. Community notification methods included press releases, flyers, phone calls, door-to-door contact, neighborhood meetings, and Internet sites, which informed citizens of the name, location, and/or other information of persons who had been convicted of sex crimes.

Part II of this note will describe current sex-offender restrictions in place across the country. Part III will provide a constitutional analysis …


Comment - Assuring Continuity Of Government, Sanford Levinson Jun 2006

Comment - Assuring Continuity Of Government, Sanford Levinson

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

Reply to Seth Tillman's article , Comment - Assuring Continuity of Government, 4 Pierce L. Rev. 201 (2006), available at http://scholars.unh.edu/unh_lr/vol4/iss2/4

[Excerpt]”What makes Tillman’s proposal distinctive, and important, is that it presents a statutory solution to at least aspects of the problem. It is an audacious proposal well worth discussing at greater length than I have time for in preparing this brief comment. Before turning to the specifics of his proposal, though, it is worth spelling out the possible situation that underlies the concern displayed by an increasing number of thoughtful Americans about the issue of continuity in government. […] …


Model Continuity Of Congress Statute, Seth Barrett Tillman Jun 2006

Model Continuity Of Congress Statute, Seth Barrett Tillman

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "Although, the reasoning of Chadha arguably extends to actions taken pursuant to this Model Statute, the facts of any litigation arising from this Model Statute are substantially different from the facts of Chadha. Unlike Chadha, all orders, resolutions, and votes made pursuant to this Model Statute are presented. Any litigation arising under this Model Statute will permit lower courts to take a fresh look at Chadha’s bicameralism rationale apart from the presentment issues, which are not at play under the terms of this statute. "


Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis Jun 2006

Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "The current federal government, with its burgeoning administrative agencies, does not embody what most Americans would recognize as the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This is, in part, due to the Congress’s frequent practice of delegating legislative powers to the executive branch, i.e., giving administrative agencies the power to promulgate rules regulating private behavior and having the force of law. Legislative delegation has been the subject of academic, legal, and political wrangling since the early congresses and clearly calls into question whether modern practice adheres to constitutional norms. This article discusses legislative delegation in terms of some core …


Does Changing The Definition Of Science Solve The Establishment Clause Problem For Teaching Intelligent Design As Science In Public Schools? Doing An End-Run Around The Constitution, Ann Marie Lofaso Jun 2006

Does Changing The Definition Of Science Solve The Establishment Clause Problem For Teaching Intelligent Design As Science In Public Schools? Doing An End-Run Around The Constitution, Ann Marie Lofaso

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "When Charles Darwin published On the Origin of Species By Means of Natural Selection in 1859, it sparked some of the most contentious debates in American intellectual history, debates that continue to rage today. Although these debates have numerous political ramifications, the question posed in this paper is narrow: Does the Establishment Clause permit a particular assessment of current evolutionary theory – intelligent design (“ID”) – to be taught as science in American elementary and secondary public schools? This article shows that it does not.

To understand current disputes over whether and how to teach the origins of life …


States’ Rights And The Scope Of The Treaty Power: Could The Patriot Act Be Constitutional As A Treaty?, Simcha Herzog May 2005

States’ Rights And The Scope Of The Treaty Power: Could The Patriot Act Be Constitutional As A Treaty?, Simcha Herzog

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] “Consider the following hypothetical scenario: after an appeal by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Supreme Court determines that the Patriot Act is unconstitutional. This decision so infuriates President Bush that he seeks out the advice of his legal counsel in a frantic attempt to bypass the Court’s ruling. After some research, President Bush’s legal advisers give him two options: he can either attempt to pass an amendment to the constitution or, with the “advice and consent of the Senate,” he can sign the Patriot Act as a treaty with a foreign nation. Either of these measures will evade …


The Confines Of Modern Constitutionalism, David T. Butleritchie Dec 2004

The Confines Of Modern Constitutionalism, David T. Butleritchie

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "Constitutionalism is an ambiguous concept, or at least the term is used in ambiguous ways. Virtually every political theorist of the modern period, certainly during the last two hundred years or more, has used the concept of a political constitution in some way or another. There is very little agreement, however, on what the term constitutionalism actually represents. Some mean it in a restrictive way, others in a more expansive way. Some use it in a proscriptive manner, while others employ it prescriptively (some, perhaps, even use it pejoratively). What nearly everyone who uses the term shares, though, is …


The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky Mar 2004

The Rehnquist Revolution, Erwin Chemerinsky

The University of New Hampshire Law Review

[Excerpt] "When historians look back at the Rehnquist Court, without a doubt they will say that its greatest changes in constitutional law were in the area of federalism. Over the past decade, and particularly over the last five years, the Supreme Court has dramatically limited the scope of Congress’ powers and has greatly expanded the protection of state Sovereign Immunity. Virtually every area of law, criminal and civil, is touched by these changes. Since I began teaching constitutional law in 1980, the most significant differences in constitutional law are a result of the Supreme Court’s revival of federalism as a …


Should Trial By Jury Be Eliminated In Complex Cases, Hugh H. Bownes Jan 1990

Should Trial By Jury Be Eliminated In Complex Cases, Hugh H. Bownes

RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)

One way in which the public participates in the management of Risk is as jurors. Here, the function of juries in civil litigation is discussed and the argument is made that problems with juries in complex cases may be solved by means short of eliminating juries altogether.