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Making The Right Call For Confrontation At Felony Sentencing, Shaakirrah R. Sanders

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Felony sentencing courts have discretion to increase punishment based on un-cross-examined testimonial statements about several categories of uncharged, dismissed, or otherwise unproven criminal conduct. Denying defendants an opportunity to cross-examine these categories of sentencing evidence undermines a core principle of natural law as adopted in the Sixth Amendment: those accused of felony crimes have the right to confront adversarial witnesses. This Article contributes to the scholarship surrounding confrontation rights at felony sentencing by cautioning against continued adherence to the most historic Supreme Court case on this issue, Williams v. New York. This Article does so for reasons beyond the unacknowledged …

Confrontation And Domestic Violence Post-Davis: Is There And Should There Be A Doctrinal Exception, Eleanor Simon

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are perpetrated against women in the United States annually. Domestic violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced by women in this county. Despite these statistics, many have argued that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the] back" of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded offender accountability in domestic violence prosecutions," and has directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence prosecutions. The asserted cause is the Court's complete and groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a criminal …

"An Opportunity For Effective Cross-Examination": Limits On The Confrontation Right Of The Pro Se Defendant, Alanna Clair

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

The rights of a defendant to confront his accusers and conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel are sacrosanct in the American judicial system. The rights of the defendant are even sometimes exalted at the expense of the rights of the public or of victims of crime. This Note examines the problem of a pro se defendant using his confrontation right to intimidate or harass his alleged victims testifying against him. It is well-established that the confrontation right is not unconditional. The problem comes in determining whether the courts can place limits on the confrontation right of a pro …

Davis And Hammon: A Step Forward, Or A Step Back?, Tom Lininger

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Prosecutors, defense attorneys, and lower court judges hoped that the Supreme Court’s ruling in the consolidated cases of Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereafter simply Davis) would provide a primer on testimonial hearsay. In retrospect, these hopes were somewhat unrealistic. The Davis ruling could not possibly clear up all the confusion that followed Crawford v. Washington, the landmark 2004 case in which the Court strengthened the right of the accused to confront declarants of testimonial hearsay. In Davis, the Court focused on the facts under review and developed a taxonomy that will be useful in similar cases, but …

Circling Around The Confrontation Clause: Redefined Reach But Not A Robust Right, Lisa Kern Griffin

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated ruling in United States v. Davis and United States v. Hammon is a classic of the genre of consensus opinions to which the Roberts Court aspired in its first, transitional term. The opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, contains practical accommodations unusual in a decision by the Court’s fiercest proponent of first principles. The restraint that characterized the term is, of course, more about considerations of logistics (including the desire to avoid re-arguments after the mid-term replacement of Justice O’Connor) than about the alignment of logic. Because it reflects temporary institutional constraints rather than intellectual agreement, the …

Davis/Hammon, Domestic Violence, And The Supreme Court: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Joan S. Meier

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Supreme Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana offers something for everyone: by “splitting the difference” between the two cases—affirming one and reversing the other—the opinion provides much grist for advocates’ mills on both sides of this issue. While advocates for defendants’ rights are celebrating the opinion’s continued revitalization of the right to confrontation, which began in Crawford v. Washington, advocates for victims have cause for celebration as well: the decision is notable for its reflection of the Court’s growing—albeit incomplete— awareness and understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and their implications for justice. …

Still "Left In The Dark": The Confrontation Clause And Child Abuse Cases After Davis V. Washington, Anthony J. Franze, Jacob E. Smiles

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

In his concurring opinion in Crawford v. Washington, Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for holding that the Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” statements but leaving for “another day” any effort to define sufficiently what “testimonial” means. Prosecutors and defendants, he said, “should not be left in the dark in this manner.” Over the next two years, both sides grappled with the meaning of testimonial, each gleaning import from sections of Crawford that seemingly proved their test was the right one. When the Court granted certiorari in Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (hereinafter Davis), hopes were high that …

Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana: Beating Expectations, Robert P. Mosteller

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

I begin with a question of effectiveness: does the new Confrontation Clause doctrine effectively protect defendants with respect to the most im-portant types of problematic out-of-court statements? Although they leave much room for the introduction of hearsay in the immediate aftermath of crime generally, Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana (together hereinafter Davis) are better opinions from that broad perspective than I had feared. The new doctrine now covers and provides substantial procedural protection for a very important class of problematic hearsay—statements made to government agents investigating past crime.

Refining Crawford: The Confrontation Claus After Davis V. Washington And Hammon V. Indiana, Andrew C. Fine

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transformation of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that “testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmissible in the absence of …

Proposed Amendments To Fed. R. Crim. P. 26: An Exchange: Remote Testimony - A Prosecutor's Perspective, Lynn Helland

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Although the Supreme Court has declined, for now, to endorse the Judicial Conference proposal to add a Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit live video testimony under limited circumstances, I agree with Professor Friedman that the matter is far from over. This is both because the potential benefits to be realized from the use of remote video testimony are too large to ignore and because, on closer inspection, any Confrontation Clause concerns that might underlie the Court's hesitation to adopt the proposal are not warranted. My purpose in writing is to summarize some of the …

Reconceiving The Right To Present Witnesses, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

Modem American law is, in a sense, a system of compartments. For understandable curricular reasons, legal education sharply distinguishes the law of evidence from both constitutional law and criminal procedure. In fact, the lines of demarcation between these three subjects extend well beyond law school to the organization of the leading treatises and case headnotes to which practicing lawyers routinely refer in their trade. Many of the most interesting questions in the law, however, do not rest squarely within a single compartment; instead, they concern the content and legitimacy of the lines of demarcation themselves. This article explores a significant, …

Commentary By Co-Defendant's Counsel On Defendant's Refusal To Testify: A Violation Of The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination?, Martin D. Litt

Michigan Law Review

Currently, the circuits are divided on whether comments by co-defendants' counsel on a defendant's silence impair that defendant's fifth amendment rights. Furthermore, among the circuits that regard such commentary as potentially prejudicial, disagreement exists over the proper test for identifying such comments. This Note asserts that the risk of prejudicing a defendant's fifth amendment rights is too great to allow counsel any comment on a defendant's decision to testify or to remain silent.

Part I of this Note examines the historical evolution of the privilege against self-incrimination and the policy goals behind the privilege. The Note argues that prohibiting comments …

The Admissibility Of Prior Silence To Impeach The Testimony Of Criminal Defendants, Rex A. Sharp

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note focuses on whether a defendant who was called as a witness at the prior, severed trial of a codefendant and refused to testify by invoking the fifth amendment can subsequently be impeached by this silence at his own trial. In addition to the obvious implications this issue has for severed criminal trials, the factors considered when deciding whether impeachment by silence should be allowed generally are in sharpest focus in this factual setting. Thus, the analysis of the constitutional and evidentiary questions this Note enlists to argue that impeachment by silence in this context is permissible applies as …

Constitutional Constraints On The Admissibility Of Grand Jury Testimony: The Unavailable Witness, Confrontation, And Due Process, Barbara L. Strack

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

Defendants, however, have raised serious constitutional objections to the introduction of grand jury testimony when the witness is unavailable to testify at trial. These claims have focused on the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment and the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Defendants have contended that the introduction of testimony from a grand jury proceeding which cannot be subjected to cross-examination fatally compromises the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lower courts are split over admitting grand jury testimony in these circumstances, and the Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue. As a result, …

Griffin V. California: Still Viable After All These Years, Craig M. Bradley

Michigan Law Review

In a recent article in the Michigan Law Review, Donald Ayer levels a series of attacks on the Griffin decision. Specifically, he maintains that the decision is at once too broad, because it requires "almost automatic reversal where there are any remarks explicitly focused on the defendant's silence and the inference of guilt to be drawn from it" regardless of the strength of the prosecution's case, and too narrow, because it fails to prevent the natural prejudice against the nontestifying defendant that may arise in the minds of the jurors without any encouragement from prosecutor or judge. Ayer also …

Reflections On Alfred Hill's "Testimonial Privilege And Fair Trial", Peter Westen

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

I have learned a great deal from "Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial"-as I always do from Professor Hill's work. Indeed, he has changed my way of thinking in this area in several important respects. At the same time, I come to rather different conclusions than he regarding each of his three major topics. Part I of this article examines the problem of finding a "remedy" for testimonial privileges that violate a defendant's right to a fair trial. Part II discusses the problem of determining when a defendant is entitled to assert that the "right" has been violated. Finally, Part III …

The Future Of Confrontation, Peter K. Westen

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court seems to be setting the stage for a long-awaited examination of the confrontation clause. It has been ten years since the Court endeavored in Dutton v. Evans to reconcile the evidentiary rules of hearsay with the constitutional commands of confrontation. Dutton came at the tail end of a string of confrontation cases that the Court had resolved without apparent difficulty. Not surprisingly, the Court approached Dutton in the evident belief that it could resolve the constitutional problems of hearsay once and for all. Instead, after oral argument in 1969 and a rehearing in 1970, the Court found …

Compulsory Process Ii, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

This Article examines the validity of the conventional wisdom. It draws support for its analysis from the constitutional principles of compulsory process, and, in their absence, from related doctrine in the areas of a defendant's right to confront witnesses against him and his right to a fair trial. Part I of the article defines the constitutional standard that governs the simple case of a nonindigent defendant who makes a timely application to produce a witness from within the territory of the jurisdiction. Parts II through IV, in turn, examine that standard in the light of complicating factors such as the …

The Compulsory Process Clause, Peter Westen

Michigan Law Review

Part I of this article traces the history of compulsory process, from its origin in the English transition from an inquisitional to an adversary system of procedure to its eventual adoption in the American Bill of Rights. Part II examines the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Washington v. Texas, which recognized after a century and a half of silence that the compulsory process clause was designed to enable the defendant not only to produce witnesses, but to put them on the stand and have them heard. Part III studies the implications of compulsory process for the defendant's case, from the …

Policing The Executive Privilege, Keith Borman

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

In response to the increasing number of confrontations over the use of the executive privilege, Senator William Fulbright has placed before the Senate a bill designed to avoid the confusion that now exacerbates the tension between the legislative and executive branches of government. This relatively uncomplicated bill defines procedures for the assertion of the executive privilege and provides sanctions to be imposed when these procedures are abused or ignored. This note reviews the nature of the controversy between the two branches of government which has contributed to the introduction of the proposed legislation, and then proceeds to examine the provisions …

Grand Jury Secrecy, Richard M. Calkins

Michigan Law Review

When a leading state such as Illinois enacts "reform" legislation, an impact on the legislatures of other jurisdictions may be anticipated. Accordingly, a need exists for an examination of this legislation in the light of the common-law background of grand jury secrecy and for a further analysis of it in the face of the growing trend toward more liberalized discovery of grand jury minutes in other jurisdictions. It is the contention of the author that such an empirical study will demonstrate that this legislation adopted by Illinois is contrary to all modern judicial thinking and is, in fact, a retrogressive …

Constitutional Law - Due Process And Right Of Confrontation- Jencks Act, Robert J. Margolin S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The Jencks Act like the rule it purportedly reaffirmed, was designed to insure "justice." Although the stated purpose of the act was to preserve the rights of any defendant under due process of law, the question remains unresolved whether, in articulating the rule in terms of "justice," the Court in Jencks v. United States incorporated it into the requirements of due process. To be sure, the underlying intent of both the Court and Congress is unclear, but of far more concern than the intent is whether the Jencks Act, in fact, violates the constitutional mandates of the Fifth and Sixth …

Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination - Danger Of Prosecution In Other Jurisdictions, George R. Haydon, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Defendant, a witness called by the New Hampshire attorney general in an investigation of subversive activities, was granted statutory immunity in New Hampshire from criminal prosecution which might arise from his testimony and was ordered to testify. Since any disclosures would create serious danger of prosecution by the United States and Massachusetts, whose agencies were also investigating his activities, defendant refused to testify despite the grant of immunity, invoking the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the state constitution. He was found guilty of contempt, subject to his exceptions regarding the constitutionality of the immunity statute. On hearing before the state …

Constitutional Law - Privilege Against Self-Incrimination -Effect Of Immunity Statute, Paul A. Heinen S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Petitioner was brought before a federal grand jury and questioned as to his and other persons' membership in the Communist Party. After petitioner refused to answer the questions on the ground that the answers would be self-incriminating and therefore his refusal was privileged under the Fifth Amendment, the United States attorney, proceeding under the provisions of the Immunity Act of 1954, filed an application in the United States district court requesting that petitioner be required to answer the questions. The district court, upholding the constitutionality of the act, ordered petitioner to answer the questions, and petitioner's appeal from this order …

Legislation - Witness Immunity Act Of 1954 - Constitutional And Interpretative Problem, George S. Flint S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The passage in August, 1954 of a federal statute granting immunity under specified conditions to witnesses before congressional committees and in the federal courts marks a third legislative experiment designed to soften the effect of the Fifth Amendment as a limitation on the investigatory power of Congress. The first two attempts were less than successful. This comment will discuss the historical background of immunity legislation, and some possible constitutional pitfalls and problems of construction created by the statutory language.

Griswold: The Fifth Amendment Today, George S. Flint S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

A Review of The Fifth Amendment Today. By Erwin N. Griswold

Constitutional Law - Legislative Contempt Power-Procedure Against Witness For Conduct Before Commission Composed Of Legislators And Others, Julius B. Poppinga

Michigan Law Review

The Massachusetts General Court, for the purpose of investigating communism and subversive activities within the Commonwealth, established by joint resolution a "special commission" composed of two members of the Senate, three members of the House, and two persons to be appointed by the governor. When the commission summoned Otis A. Hood to appear before it, he refused to be sworn as a witness without first receiving witness fees, and flippantly expressed his demand for payment. The general court requested an advisory opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, propounding three questions: (1) whether the special commission was a committee …

Evidence - Constitutional Problems In Compelling The Attendance Of Witnesses Outside The State, Paul J. Keller, Jr.

Michigan Law Review

Cooper, a citizen of New Jersey, was sought as a witness by a defendant in a criminal prosecution in a New York court in accordance with a New Jersey statute, which allowed such a procedure upon certain conditions. The conditions included a hearing in New Jersey on the summons and provisions for compensation and immunity from service of process while acting on the writ outside the state. At the New Jersey hearing on the summons Cooper objected on the ground that the statute was an unconstitutional deprivation of his liberty. Held, that the statute is constitutional. In re Cooper …