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Moore V. Harper: The Independent State Legislature Theory And The Court At The Brink, Braden Fain
Moore V. Harper: The Independent State Legislature Theory And The Court At The Brink, Braden Fain
Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar
Moore v. Harper tasks the Supreme Court with considering a fringe legal idea known as the Independent State Legislature Theory (ISLT). Donald Trump gave ISLT new life by invoking the theory during his attempts to overturn the results of the 2020 election. Instead of presidential elections, the litigation in Moore concerns congressional elections and partisan gerrymandering. Were the Court to accept ISLT, the theory would render states effectively impotent to curb gerrymandering and would aggrandize the Court's authority in federal elections. Scholars have recognized the theory's threat to American democracy and have accordingly produced a detailed record debunking the ISLT. …
Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.
In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …
Dartmouth College V. Woodward And The Structure Of Civil Society, Ernest A. Young
Dartmouth College V. Woodward And The Structure Of Civil Society, Ernest A. Young
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Sustaining Collective Self-Governance And Collective Action: A Constitutional Role Morality For Presidents And Members Of Congress, Neil S. Siegel
Sustaining Collective Self-Governance And Collective Action: A Constitutional Role Morality For Presidents And Members Of Congress, Neil S. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
In the United States today, the behavior of the political branches is generally viewed as more damaging to the American constitutional system than is the behavior of the federal courts. Yet constitutional law scholarship continues to focus primarily on judges and judging. This Article suggests that such scholarship should develop for presidents and members of Congress what it has long advocated for judges: a role morality that imposes normative limits on the exercise of official discretion over and above strictly legal limits. The Article first grounds a role morality for federal elected officials in two purposes of the U.S. Constitution …
The United States As An Idea: Constitutional Reflections, H. Jefferson Powell
The United States As An Idea: Constitutional Reflections, H. Jefferson Powell
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Continuity And The Declaration Of Independence, Darrell A. H. Miller
Continuity And The Declaration Of Independence, Darrell A. H. Miller
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Reynolds Reconsidered, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
Reynolds Reconsidered, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Mandatory Constitutions, Paul D. Carrington
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint, Donald L. Horowitz
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint, Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutions are generally made by people with no previous experience in constitution making. The assistance they receive from outsiders is often less useful than it may appear. The most pertinent foreign experience may reside in distant countries, whose lessons are unknown or inaccessible. Moreover, although constitutions are intended to endure, they are often products of the particular crisis that forced their creation. Drafters are usually heavily affected by a desire to avoid repeating unpleasant historical experiences or to emulate what seem to be successful constitutional models. Theirs is a heavily constrained environment, made even more so by distrust and dissensus …
Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, Donald L. Horowitz
Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Constitutional Pluralism And Democratic Politics: Reflections On The Interpretive Approach Of Baker V. Carr, Guy-Uriel Charles
Constitutional Pluralism And Democratic Politics: Reflections On The Interpretive Approach Of Baker V. Carr, Guy-Uriel Charles
Faculty Scholarship
Baker v. Carr is one of the Supreme Court's most important opinions, not least because its advent signaled the constitutionalization of democracy. Unfortunately, as is typical of the Court's numerous forays into democratic politics, the decision is not accompanied by an apparent vision of the relationship among democratic practice, constitutional law, and democratic theory. In this Article, Professor Charles revisits Baker and provides several democratic principles that he argues justifies the Court's decision to engage the democratic process. He examines the decision from the perspective of one of its chief contemporary critics, Justice Frankfurter. He sketches an approach, described as …
Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, Donald L. Horowitz
Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …