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Let History Repeat Itself: Solving Originalism's History Problem In Interpreting The Establishment Clause, Neil Joseph

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence is all over the place. The current justices have widely divergent views on the Establishment Clause's meaning, and the Lemon test has been widely panned by several justices. Originalist judges, however, have had a fairly consistent approach to interpreting the Establishment Clause. This largely stems from their reliance on history. This Note argues that their use of history in analyzing the Establishment Clause is flawed. Originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been and is criticized for being unprincipled. And those criticisms are correct. Originalists encounter such criticism because the justices struggle to reconcile historical practice …

Gamble V. United States: A Commentary, Kayla Mullen

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Under the judicially created dual-sovereignty exception, a defendant may be prosecuted by state and federal governments for the same conduct, due to the fact that the state and federal government constitute two separate sovereignties. The doctrine is grounded in the idea that each sovereign derives its power from independent sources—the federal government from the Constitution and the states from their inherent police power, preserved to them by the Tenth Amendment—and thus, each sovereign may determine what constitutes an offense against its peace and dignity in an exercise of its own sovereignty. Under this exception, defendants, by a single act, may …

Litigating War: The Justiciability Of Executive War Power, Chris Smith

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Courts frequently dismiss claims against the Executive’s use of the war power as being non-justiciable political questions. This lack of a judicial check has created a situation in which meaningful checks and balances on the war power are found only in the Executive Branch itself. But the Constitution places the bulk of war powers in the hands of Congress. Executive usurpation of Congress’s constitutional prerogative to initiate hostilities has significantly weakened the separation of powers. In the aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reassert its constitutional authority over war-making decisions by passing the War Powers Resolution. The Resolution …

The Race Horse That Wouldn't Die: On Herrera V. Wyoming, Benjamin Cantor

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

In Herrera v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court is considering how to reconcile the Crow Tribe’s hunting right with Wyoming’s sovereignty. This endeavor requires examining nineteenth-century treaties and precedents to decipher the intents of the Crow Tribe and the United States government. If the Court’s decision includes a clear articulation of whether Native American treaty rights may be truncated by mere implication, tribes nationwide may be at risk of losing treaty rights they have enjoyed for centuries. In making its decision, the Supreme Court will also have to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of overturning precedent and of undermining its …

Apple V. Pepper: Applying The Indirect Purchaser Rule To Online Platforms, Jason Wasserman

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Long-established antitrust precedent bars customers who buy a firm’s product through intermediaries from suing that firm for antitrust damages. In Apple Inc. v. Pepper, this “indirect purchaser rule” is brought into the smartphone age in a price-fixing dispute between technology giant Apple and iPhone users. This case will determine whether iPhone users buy smartphone applications directly from Apple through the App Store, or if Apple is merely an intermediary seller-agent of app developers. The indirect purchase rule is generally considered settled precedent. How the rule should apply to online platforms, however, differs between circuit courts, which have split on …

A Test Of Sovereignty: Franchise Tax Board Of The State Of California V. Gilbert P. Hyatt, Timothy Dill

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

In Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt, the Supreme Court considers whether to overrule Nevada v. Hall, a 1979 Supreme Court decision. Hall permitted a State to be haled into the court of another State without its consent. In 2016, an evenly divided Supreme Court affirmed Hall 4-4 when faced with the same question, and following a remand to the Nevada Supreme Court, the Court has granted certiorari on this question once again. This Commentary contends that Hall was wrongly decided and should be overruled. The Constitution’s ratification did not alter the status of common-law State sovereign …

Legislator-Led Legislative Prayer And The Search For Religious Neutrality, Aishwarya Masrani

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Leading a group in prayer in a public setting blurs the line between public and private. Such blurring implicates a constitutional tension between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. This tension is magnified when the constitutionality of prayer is questioned in the context of democratic participation. Current Supreme Court precedent holds legislative prayer to be constitutional, but the relevant cases, Marsh v. Chambers and Town of Greece, NY v. Galloway, do not address the specific constitutionality of legislator-led prayer. There is currently a circuit split on the subject: in Bormuth v. County of Jackson, the United …

Stepping Into The Breach: State Constitutions As A Vehicle For Advancing Rights-Based Climate Litigation, Benjamin T. Sharp

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

The perceived failures of the political branches to mitigate climate change have led climate change activists to seek alternative means to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; many are turning to litigation. The claims in these cases rely on a variety of legal bases, but this Note will focus on those cases claiming that governments’ failures to prevent climate change amount to violations of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Rights-based climate change litigation is likely to increase in the future. Among the most prominent of the surviving rights-based cases is Juliana v. …

Bucklew V. Precythe: The Power Of Assumptions And Lethal Injection, Renata Gomez

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

Once again, the Supreme Court of the United States has an opportunity to determine the extent to which death-row inmates can bring as-applied challenges to the states’ method of execution and prevent possible botched executions. In Bucklew v. Precythe, the Court will confront the assumptions that the execution team is equipped to handle any execution and that the procedure will go as planned. Additionally, the Court will determine whether the standard articulated in Glossip v. Gross, which requires inmates asserting facial challenges to the states’ method of execution to plead a readily available alternative method of execution, further …

Swords Into Plowshares: Nuclear Power And The Atomic Energy Act’S Preemptive Scope In Virginia Uranium, Inc. V. Warren, Francis X. Liesman

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

This commentary highlights the considerations the Supreme Court should attend to in its decision in Virginia Uranium, Inc. v. Warren, both in construing § 2021(k) and in reviewing the Fourth Circuit’s reading of precedent from other circuits and from the Court’s prior opinions. Specifically, the Court must clarify how to interpret § 2021(k)’s activities component in concert with its “for purposes” language and determine the importance of the particular underlying activity the state seeks to regulate in a preemption analysis under the Atomic Energy Act. Clarification is necessary to ensure that courts properly effectuate Congress’s intent in regulating nuclear …

Timbs V. Indiana: The Constitutionality Of Civil Forfeiture When Used By States, Kris Fernandez

Duke Journal of Constitutional Law & Public Policy Sidebar

In Timbs v. Indiana, Petitioner Tyson Timbs asks the Supreme Court to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment against the states, providing extra protection for individuals against fines and forfeiture that are “grossly disproportionate” to the harm caused. The decision to incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause and the guidelines for applying that incorporation would have a substantial effect on governments, which often rely on the revenue gained from forfeiture. This commentary argues that the Supreme Court of the United States should incorporate the Excessive Fines Clause based on historical support of an individual’s right to be …

The State Of The Death Penalty, Ankur Desai, Brandon L. Garrett

Faculty Scholarship

The death penalty is in decline in America and most death penalty states do not regularly impose death sentences. In 2016 and 2017, states reached modern lows in imposed death sentences, with just thirty-one defendants sentenced to death in 2016 and thirty-nine in 2017, as compared with over three hundred per year in the 1990s. In 2016, only thirteen states imposed death sentences, and in 2017, fourteen did so, although thirty-one states retain the death penalty. What explains this remarkable and quite unexpected trend? In this Article, we present new analysis of state-level legislative changes that might have been expected …

Immigration Detainers, Local Discretion, And State Law's Historical Constraints, Kate Evans

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Dartmouth College V. Woodward And The Structure Of Civil Society, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Response: Rights As Trumps Of What?, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Bans, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

In the universe of legal restrictions subject to judicial review, those characterized as fully denying some aspect of a constitutional right—bans—are often subject to per se rules of invalidity. Whether the subject of the restriction is a medium of expression, the valuable use of property, or a class of weapons, courts in such cases will often short-circuit the standard doctrinal machinery and strike down the law, even if it might have survived heightened scrutiny. Identifying laws as bans can thus provide an end run around the tiers of scrutiny and other familiar forms of means-ends analysis.

And yet it is …

Dying Constitutionalism And The Fourteenth Amendment, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

The notion of a “living Constitution” often rests on an implicit assumption that important constitutional values will “grow” in such a way as to make the Constitution more attractive over time. But there are no guarantees: What can grow can also wither and die. This essay, presented as the 2018 Robert F. Boden Lecture at Marquette University Law School, marks the sesquicentennial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification as a powerful charter of liberty and equality for black Americans. But for much of its early history, the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning moved in reverse, overwhelmed by the end of Reconstruction, the gradual …

Originalism And The Law Of The Past, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Originalism has long been criticized for its “law office history” and other historical sins. But a recent “positive turn” in originalist thought may help make peace between history and law. On this theory, originalism is best understood as a claim about our modern law — which borrows many of its rules, constitutional or otherwise, from the law of the past. Our law happens to be the Founders’ law, unless lawfully changed.

This theory has three important implications for the role of history in law. First, whether and how past law matters today is a question of current law, not of …

Grounding Originalism, William Baude, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

How should we interpret the Constitution? The “positive turn” in legal scholarship treats constitutional interpretation, like the interpretation of statutes or contracts, as governed by legal rules grounded in actual practice. In our legal system, that practice requires a certain form of originalism: our system’s official story is that we follow the law of the Founding, plus all lawful changes made since.

Or so we’ve argued. Yet this answer produces its own set of questions. How can practice solve our problems, when there are so many theories of law, each giving practice a different role? Why look to an official …

Free Speech And Justified True Belief, Joseph Blocher

Faculty Scholarship

Law often prioritizes justified true beliefs. Evidence, even if probative and correct, must have a proper foundation. Expert witness testimony must be the product of reliable principles and methods. Prosecutors are not permitted to trick juries into convicting a defendant, even if that defendant is truly guilty. Judges’ reasons, and not just the correctness of their holdings, are the engines of precedent. Lawyers are, in short, familiar with the notion that one must be right for the right reasons.

And yet the standard epistemic theory of the First Amendment—that the marketplace of ideas is the “best test of truth”—has generally …

Owning Heller, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

Recent historical research using big-data techniques casts doubt on whether District of Columbia v. Heller was rightly decided according to originalist methods. These new discoveries put originalists in a bind. Do they embrace “faint hearted” originalism: the idea that as between the need for stability in prior decision making, settled expectations, and the coherence of the law, some adulterated decisions must remain enforced for the greater good? Or do they follow Justice Thomas’s reasoning in Gamble v. United States, remain stout-hearted, and reject any prior decision that cannot be supported by the common linguistic usage of the founding era – …

Supreme Court As Superweapon: A Response To Epps & Sitaraman, Stephen E. Sachs

Faculty Scholarship

Is the Supreme Court's legitimacy in crisis? Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman argue that it is. In their Feature, How to Save the Supreme Court, they suggest legally radical reforms to restore a politically moderate Court. Unfortunately, their proposals might destroy the Court's legitimacy in order to save it. And their case that there is any crisis may fail to persuade a reader with different legal or political priors. If the Supreme Court needs saving, it will be saving from itself, and from too broad a conception of its own legal omnipotence. A Court that seems unbound by legal principle …

The Emergence Of The American Constitutional Law Tradition, H. Jefferson Powell

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Conflict And Sensitive Places, Darrell A. H. Miller

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Doctrinal Dynamism, Borrowing, And The Relationship Between Rules And Rights, Joseph Blocher, Luke Morgan

Faculty Scholarship

The study of "Rights Dynamism," exemplified in Timothy Zick' s new book on the First Amendment's relationship with the rest of the Bill of Rights, can enrich our understanding of constitutional rights. It also opens a door to another potentially fruitful arena: what we call "Doctrinal Dynamism." Constitutional rights often interact and generate new meanings and applications by way of importing and exporting one another's doctrinal rules, even when the rights themselves do not intersect directly in the context of a single case. Focusing on these doctrinal exchanges can illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of various rules, the specific interests …

State Standing And Cooperative Federalism, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

State lawsuits challenging federal policy generally encounter arguments that the states lack standing to sue, either under Article III’s “case or controversy” clause or under various prudential standing doctrines. These arguments have often taken novel forms—such as claims that states’ injuries are “self-inflicted” or offset by other benefits of federal policies—that have few precedents or analogs in the standing jurisprudence governing suits by private individuals. The United States has taken the position, in other words, that states should have special disabilities in filing lawsuits that would not apply to ordinary litigants. Likewise, prominent academics have argued that uniquely narrow standing …

Brief Of Public Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Petitioners, Chris Dove, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.