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Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Dysfunction, Deference, And Judicial Review, Barry Friedman, Margaret H. Lemos
Faculty Scholarship
This symposium poses a provocative question: Should judges exercising the power of judicial review defer to the political branches as a means of giving voice to the “will of the people”? The inquiry assumes a connection between majority will and the outputs of the political branches—a connection we argue is frayed, at best, in the current political context.
In the first part of this Essay, we highlight how well-known aspects of our political system—ranging from representational distortions in federal and state governments to the relationship between partisan polarization and the behavior of elected officials—call into question whether political outcomes reliably …
Race And Guns, Courts And Democracy, Joseph Blocher, Reva B. Siegel
Race And Guns, Courts And Democracy, Joseph Blocher, Reva B. Siegel
Faculty Scholarship
Is racism in gun regulation reason to look to the Supreme Court to expand Second Amendment rights? While discussion of race and guns recurs across the briefs in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association v. Bruen, it is especially prominent in the brief of legal aid attorneys and public defenders who employed their Second Amendment arguments to showcase stories of racial bias in the enforcement of New York’s licensing and gun possession laws. Because this Second Amendment claim came from a coalition on the left, it was widely celebrated by gun rights advocates.
In this Essay we address issues …
Judicial Intervention As Judicial Restraint, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer
Judicial Intervention As Judicial Restraint, Guy-Uriel Charles, Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer
Faculty Scholarship
This paper examines the Court's decision in Gil v. Whitford. It advances two claims. First, it provides a comprehensive account of the Court's skepticism of judicial supervision of democratic politics, an account that we call the narrative of nonintervention. It situates Gill within that account and argues that the Court's reluctance to intervene is a function of the Court's institutional calculus that it ought to protect its legitimacy and institutional capital when it engages in what look like political fights. Second, the paper provides an instrumentalist account for judicial intervention. It argues that the Court should intervene to prevent partisan …
Reynolds Reconsidered, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
Reynolds Reconsidered, Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Plenary Power Preemption, Kerry Abrams
A System Of Wholesale Denial Of Rights, Michael E. Tigar
A System Of Wholesale Denial Of Rights, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Marshall’S Questions, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, H. Jefferson Powell
Marshall’S Questions, Walter E. Dellinger Iii, H. Jefferson Powell
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Judicial Restraint In The Administrative State: Beyond The Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Matthew D. Adler
Faculty Scholarship
Arguments for judicial restraint point to some kind of judicial deficit (such as a democratic or an epistemic deficit) as grounds for limiting judicial review. ("Judicial review" is used in this Article to mean, essentially, the judicial invalidation of statutes, rules, orders and actions in virtue of the Bill of Rights, or similar unwritten criteria.). The most influential argument for judicial restraint has been the Countermajoritarian Difficulty. This is a legislature-centered argument: one that points to features of *legislatures*, as grounds for courts to refrain from invalidating *statutes*. This Article seeks to recast scholarly debate about judicial restraint, and to …
What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar
What The Constitution Means By Executive Power, Charles J. Cooper, Orrin Hatch, Eugene V. Rowstow, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Judicial Power, The “Political Question Doctrine,” And Foreign Relations, Michael E. Tigar
Judicial Power, The “Political Question Doctrine,” And Foreign Relations, Michael E. Tigar
Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.