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Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers
Unfit For Prime Time: Why Cable Television Regulations Cannot Perform Trinko's 'Antitrust Function', Keith Klovers
Michigan Law Review
Until recently, regulation and antitrust law operated in tandem to safeguard competition in regulated industries. In three recent decisions-Trinko, Credit Suisse, and Linkline-the Supreme Court limited the operation of the antitrust laws when regulation "performs the antitrust function." This Note argues that cable programming regulations-which are in some respects factually similar to the telecommunications regulations at issue in Trinko and Linkline-do not perform the antitrust function because they cannot deter anticompetitive conduct. As a result, Trinko and its siblings should not foreclose antitrust claims for damages that arise out of certain cable programming disputes.
Choosing Between The Necessity And Public Interest Standards In Fcc Review Of Media Ownership Rules, Peter Dicola
Choosing Between The Necessity And Public Interest Standards In Fcc Review Of Media Ownership Rules, Peter Dicola
Michigan Law Review
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended, directs the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to review its media ownership rules every four years. But the statute contains an ambiguity regarding the standard of review that the FCC must apply during such proceedings. To retain a particular media ownership regulation, must the FCC merely show that the regulation advances one of the FCC's three public-interest goals for media: competition, diversity, and localism-applying a "public interest" standard? Or must the FCC meet the higher burden of demonstrating that the regulation is also indispensable for maintaining competition, diversity, or localism at …