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Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Regulation Of Franchisor Opportunism And Production Of The Institutional Framework: Federal Monopoly Or Competition Between The States?, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
Most scholars would agree that a merger between General Motors and Ford should not be judged solely by Delaware corporate law, even if both firms are incorporated in Delaware. Leaving the standards governing such mergers to state law would assuredly produce a race to the bottom that would result in unduly permissive treatment of such transactions. Similarly, if the two firms agreed to divide markets, most would agree that some regulatory authority other than Michigan or Delaware should have the final word on the agreement. Thus, in order to forestall monopoly or its equivalent, the national government must itself exercise …
Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided And Futile, Alan J. Meese
Assorted Anti-Leegin Canards: Why Resistance Is Misguided And Futile, Alan J. Meese
Alan J. Meese
In Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007), the Supreme Court reversed Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which had banned minimum resale price maintenance (“minimum RPM”) as unlawful per se. For many, Leegin was a straightforward exercise of the Court’s long-recognized authority, implied by the Sherman Act’s rule of reason, to adjust antitrust doctrine in light of new economic learning. In particular, Leegin invoked the teachings of transaction cost economics (“TCE”), which holds that many non-standard agreements, including minimum RPM, are voluntary mechanisms …