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Civil Rights-Standards For Equitable Relief After A Finding Of Employment Discrimination Are Based On Aims Of Title Vii Jan 1976

Civil Rights-Standards For Equitable Relief After A Finding Of Employment Discrimination Are Based On Aims Of Title Vii

University of Richmond Law Review

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants the federal courts jurisdiction in employment discrimination matters and sanctions orders of affirmative relief where equitable. This relief, usually in the form of back pay and injunctions, may be awarded upon a finding of intentional, discriminatory labor practices. Being equitable remedies, however, the courts have given numerous and conflicting interpretations as to when such affirmative relief should be awarded or denied. The prior history of Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody typifies the inconsistencies in this area. The case was a class action under Title VII by former and present employees …


Title Vii And 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions Jan 1976

Title Vii And 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Two Independent Solutions

University of Richmond Law Review

Two major vehicles for redressing private racial discrimination are Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In 1968 the Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., ruled that section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 18662 applied to private acts of discrimination. The plaintiff in Jones sought relief against a private real estate company under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The Court found that the substance of sections 1981 and 1982 was to be found in its predecessor, section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was intended "to prohibit all racially motivated deprivations of the …


Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Standard For Relief In Racial Discrimination Cases Requires A Showing Of Discriminatory Intent, T. Keith Fogg Jan 1976

Constitutional Law-Civil Rights-Standard For Relief In Racial Discrimination Cases Requires A Showing Of Discriminatory Intent, T. Keith Fogg

University of Richmond Law Review

When Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it did not extend the coverage of the Act to public employers. Consequently, the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. decision in 1971 created the anomalous situation that private employers were held to a tougher standard of scrutiny with respect to racial considerations in their hiring procedures under Title VII than were public employers under the Constitution. This curious development in the relationship between public employment and Title VII caused many courts to alter their standards for equal protection violations in the early 1970's. In the realm of public …


Constitutional Law- Civil Rights- Private Schools Prohibited From Excluding Qualified Children Solely Because They Are Black, Craig S. Cooley Jan 1976

Constitutional Law- Civil Rights- Private Schools Prohibited From Excluding Qualified Children Solely Because They Are Black, Craig S. Cooley

University of Richmond Law Review

All major school desegregation decisions through 1975 involved "public" schools, and were based on provisions of the fourteenth amendment. This constitutional remedy, however, requires the presence of "state action" before being triggered. Commencing with the Supreme Court's earliest public school desegregation decisions, and accelerating with the finding of affirmative duties of southern school districts to desegregate, private educational institutions following racially exclusionary admittance policies were founded. Such private discrimination generally has been considered to be beyond the scope of the fourteenth amendment. Moreover, parents that patronize such institutions have sought support in Supreme Court cases which confer constitutional protection upon …


Critique: A Defendant's View, Robert H. Patterson Jr., J. Robert Brame Iii Jan 1976

Critique: A Defendant's View, Robert H. Patterson Jr., J. Robert Brame Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

In ten years, employers have become subject to an imposing body of law regulating employment practices. This law has created two immense problems for the employer. First, enforcement of these laws is frequently capricious, arbitrary and unfair. Second, recent decisions strip the employer of his most reliable methods for selecting skilled, productive workers and threaten the efficiency of American industry.


Critique: A Plaintiff's View, Henry L. Marsh Iii Jan 1976

Critique: A Plaintiff's View, Henry L. Marsh Iii

University of Richmond Law Review

No greater challenge confronts persons seeking to enjoy America's promise of "equality and justice for all" than that of enforcing the clear congressional mandate that all forms of discrimination based on race, religion, nationality and sex be eliminated. It follows then that the continued existence of such discrimination constitutes a great danger to the moral and economic well-being of our nation.


Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination-Employer's Denial Of Disability Benefits Held To Violate Title Vii Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act Jan 1976

Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination-Employer's Denial Of Disability Benefits Held To Violate Title Vii Of The 1964 Civil Rights Act

University of Richmond Law Review

Prior to 1971 women found little relief in the courts for claims of sex discrimination. The Supreme Court upheld almost all legislation designed for the "protection" of women, predicated on their virtue, their health, or the "well being of [their] race." The first major legislative prohibition of sex discrimination, outside of judicial interpretation of the equal protec- tion clause, is found in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. It seems ironic that a provision on sex discrimination, today a frequently litigated issue, was amended to Title VII almost as an afterthought.