Digital Commons Network^™

Negotiating For Certainty In An Uncertain World, Matthew D. Kent

Emory Corporate Governance and Accountability Review

No abstract provided.

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (Spacs) And The Sec, Neal Newman, Lawrence J. Trautman

Faculty Scholarship

Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs) are simply enterprises that raise money from the public with the intention of purchasing an existing business and becoming publicly traded in the securities markets. If the SPAC is successful in raising money and the acquisition takes place, the target company takes the SPAC’s place on a stock exchange in a transaction that resembles a public offering. Also known as “blank-check” or “reverse merger” companies, this process avoids many of the pitfalls of a traditional initial public offering.

During late 2020 and 2021 an unprecedented surge in the popularity and issuance of Special Purpose Acquisition …

Mergers, Antitrust, And The Interplay Of Entrepreneurial Activity And The Investments That Fund It, Gary Dushnitsky, D. Daniel Sokol

Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law

This Article addresses the potentially negative implications of proposed antitrust legislation on the entrepreneurial ecosystem in general, with a particular focus on the venture capitalists (VCs) that fund it. First, it offers a review of how antitrust merger law currently works and how proposed legislative changes to antitrust may threaten the innovative Venture Capital (VC)-backed ecosystem that has made the United States the center of global innovation across many different industries. Accompanying this review are some empirical observations. Second, recognizing that the understanding of innovative entrepreneurial activity calls for a deep appreciation of those who back it, the Article also …

Potential Competition And Antitrust Analysis: Monopoly Profits Exceed Duopoly Profits, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This short note prepared for an OECD meeting in June 2021 examines several antitrust issues involving analysis of potential competition. While the analysis is not new, it is still useful to collect them together in a unified fashion to show how they are related. In this regard, all the analysis and conclusions flow from the overarching (and obvious) points that exclusionary conduct and agreements that maintain monopoly power very often harm consumers, and that monopoly profits typically exceed the combined duopoly profits earned by the dominant firm and the entrant, if there is successful entry. While this is not inevitably …

Competitive Harm From Vertical Mergers, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The antitrust enforcement Agencies' 2020 Vertical Merger Guidelines introduce a nontechnical application of bargaining theory into the assessment of competitive effects from vertical acquisitions. The economics of such bargaining is complex and can produce skepticism among judges, who might regard its mathematics as overly technical, its game theory as excessively theoretical or speculative, or its assumptions as unrealistic.

However, we have been there before. The introduction of concentration indexes, particularly the HHI, in the Merger Guidelines was initially met with skepticism but gradually they were accepted as judges became more comfortable with them. The same thing very largely happened again …

Getting What You Bargained For: Avoiding Legal Uncertainty In Survival Clauses For A Seller's Representations And Warranties In M&A Purchase Agreements, Will Pugh

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This note will examine the variables that effect the way that courts may limit parties’ contractual freedom to shorten or lengthen statutes of limitation. It will describe the legal levers that determine the applicable survival period and suggest ways that parties can reduce legal uncertainty around the “basket” of provisions including reps, warranties, survival, and indemnification periods. One key detail examined by this note is “borrowing statutes ”that could operate to import another state’s controlling statute. Additionally, this note will discuss ways in which the contractual right to indemnification for breached reps and warranties is a substantive right that is …

The Futility Of Walls: How Traveling Corporations Threaten State Sovereignty, Darren Rosenblum

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

Inversions--mergers in which one firm merges with another abroad to avoid taxes in its home country--have spread as globalization has reduced many of the transactional costs associated with relocating. As firms acquire the power to choose the laws that govern them, they challenge the sovereignty of nation-states, who find their ability to tax and regulate firms depleted. States and firms compete in a game of cat and mouse to adapt to this new global reality. The subversion of state power by these firms reveals the futility of walls, both literal and regulatory. This Essay describes the phenomenon of these “traveling …

Investing In Corporate Procedure, Jessica M. Erickson

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate litigation is in crisis. At the state level, shareholder lawsuits challenging mergers and other corporate decisions are ubiquitous but rarely end with meaningful relief for shareholders. At the federal level, securities class actions are rife with ethical challenges and low-value settlements. Over the last several decades, multiple groups — including judges, legislatures, and corporate boards — have tried to solve this problem, but all have come up short. This Article argues that the solution lies in rewriting the procedural rules that govern corporate lawsuits. New standing requirements would lead to better screening of these claims. Discovery limits and heightened …

Appraisal Arbitrage: In Case Of Emergency, Break Glass, Malaina J. Weldy

Notre Dame Law Review

Part I of this Note introduces the appraisal remedy, outlining its history, purpose, and modern justifications. It also details the procedural process for bringing an appraisal claim. Part II examines the rise of appraisal in its current arbitrage form, delving into the various reasons set forth to explain its rise, as well as how the recent amendments to the Delaware appraisal statute have addressed these issues. This Part also analyzes Delaware’s recent merger price “presumption” trend. Part III puts forth several arguments in light of this trend, with the intent that such arguments will both justify and protect the remedy’s …

Entire Fairness: A Call To Preserve Delaware Doctrine, Lisa Bei Li

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Appraisal arbitrage is on the rise. Institutional investors—namely, hedge funds—buy into target companies after their merger announcements and bet on the price. By purposely taking a minority position, these funds proceed to courts to obtain what they otherwise could not in the market: a “fair value.” Where there is no allegation of wrongdoing or injury, these plaintiffs nonetheless successfully divert deal value away from business combinations. Based on a misunderstood statute, appraisal arbitrage has exploded into a multi-billion dollar industry for large fund investors. In June 2016, amid growing concerns, the Delaware General Assembly amended section 262, Delaware’s appraisal statute. …

Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From The Takeover Market, Paul Mason, Usha Rodrigues, Mike Stegemoller, Steven Utke

Scholarly Works

Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into corporate governance. Each grant of a voting right thus invites the question: is the benefit achieved worth the cost the vote imposes?

The question is not merely a theoretical one. Recently the SEC, concerned about Nasdaq’s potential weakening of shareholder voting protections, has lamented that little evidence exists on the value of the shareholder vote. This Article provides that evidence. It examines …

Horizontal Shareholding And Antitrust Policy, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

“Horizontal shareholding” occurs when one or more equity funds own shares of competitors operating in a concentrated product market. For example, the four largest mutual fund companies might be large shareholders of all the major United States air carriers. A growing body of empirical literature concludes that under these conditions market output in the product market is lower and prices higher than they would otherwise be.

Here we consider how the antitrust laws might be applied to this practice, identifying the issues that courts are likely to encounter and attempting to anticipate litigation problems. We assume that neither the mutual …

The Shifting Tides Of Merger Litigation, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Steven Davidoff Solomon, Randall S. Thomas

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect a fee award.

We study what has happened in the courts in response to these changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease the volume of merger …

Appraising Merger Efficiencies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Mergers of business firms violate the antitrust laws when they threaten to lessen competition, which generally refers to a price increase resulting from a reduction in output. However, a merger that threatens competition may also enable the post-merger firm to reduce its costs or improve its product. Attitudes toward mergers are heavily driven by assumptions about efficiency gains. If mergers of competitors never produced efficiency gains but simply reduced the number of competitors, a strong presumption against them would be warranted. We tolerate most mergers because of a background, highly generalized belief that most or at least many produce cost …

The Trademark As A Novel Innovation Index, Brian J. Focarino

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

When studying the relationship that exists between entrepreneurship and intellectual property, patents receive the most scholarly attention. The attention makes sense when we consider that patents are closely associated with technical progress, grant temporary monopolies that incentivize investment in research & development (R&D), and function as vectors of technological dissemination in and of themselves. In a number of industries however, conventional forms of innovation often associated with patenting are minimal or missing altogether, and require us to look elsewhere to discern innovative behavior. This Essay highlights novel applications for trademark law to entrepreneurial activity in low-technology industries and low-financing locations …

Newsroom: Fcc's Sohn On Consumer Protection, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Tender Offers And The Sale Of Control: An Analogue To Determine The Validity Of Target Management Defense Measures, Stuart R. Cohn

Stuart R. Cohn

The hostile tender offer phenomenon has spawned wholesale defensive measures adopted by target company management. In recent years, confrontations like those of Occidental Petroleum-Mead Corporation and American Express-McGraw-Hill have resulted in target management causing the eventual withdrawal of the tender offer by employing a variety of defensive measures known colloquially as “scorched earth” tactics. The “urge to merge” among major corporations will continue to produce unsolicited, nonnegotiated tender offers at varying scales of size. Consequently, strategies and techniques have been created at a pace faster than the process of litigation, causing a discernible lag between the ingenuity of corporate management …

The Non-Merger Virtual Merger: Is Corporate Law Ready For Virtual Reality?, Stuart Cohn

Stuart R. Cohn

The term virtual mergers describes the relatively recent phenomenon of companies entering into contractual arrangements that are functionally, but not legally, equivalent to mergers prescribed by corporate statutes. Virtual mergers usually involve the shared use of assets contributed by each of the companies. A central element of the transaction is that the two companies remain legally independent, each with its own directors, officers, and shareholders. The arrangements can usually be terminated by either party, allowing each company to return to the status quo ante or exercise buyout rights if contractually provided. Although virtual mergers have occurred among public companies in …

International Implications Of The 1982 Merger Guidelines, Vincent Draa

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Incorporating Legal Claims, Maya Steinitz

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in commercial litigation funding. Whereas the judicial, legislative, and scholarly treatment of litigation finance has regarded litigation finance first and foremost as a form of champerty and sought to regulate it through rules of legal professional responsibility (hereinafter, the "legal ethics paradigm"), this Article suggests that the problems created by litigation finance are all facets of the classic problems created by "the separation of ownership and control" that have been a focus of business law since the advent of the corporate form. Therefore, an "incorporation paradigm," offered here, is more appropriate. "Incorporating …

Potential Competitive Effects Of Vertical Mergers: A How-To Guide For Practitioners, Steven C. Salop, Daniel P. Culley

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

The purpose of this short article is to aid practitioners in analyzing the competitive effects of vertical and complementary product mergers. It is also intended to assist the agencies if and when they undertake revision of the 1984 U.S. Vertical Merger Guidelines. Those Guidelines are out of date and do not reflect current enforcement or economic thinking about the potential competitive effects of vertical mergers. Nor do they provide the tools needed to carry out a modern competitive effects analysis. This article is intended to partially fill the gap by summarizing the various potential competitive harms and benefits that can …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

William H. Page

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its rivals to control …

When Bigger Is Better: A Critique Of The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index’S Use To Evaluate Mergers In Network Industries, Toby Roberts

Pace Law Review

This Article argues that the current framework used by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to evaluate mergers is inadequate in that it fails to account for network benefits. In particular, I argue for abandoning the use of the HHI in analyzing network industry mergers because the index generates little useful information about these mergers’ effect on consumer welfare. Part II describes the HHI’s historical and theoretical underpinnings and its integration into the current Merger Guidelines. Part III considers general objections to the HHI before turning to its problems in evaluating network industries. Part IV presents …

Going Once . . . Going Twice . . . Sold: The Continued Use Of "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" Standstills In Corporate Auctions, Kamaal Patterson

Kamaal Patterson

“Don’t ask, don’t waive” standstills in confidentiality agreements prevent potential bidders in a corporate auction from: (1) submitting an offer to purchase the target corporation before receiving permission; and (2) asking the target corporation to waive the standstill. These are powerful contractual provisions that can help satisfy Revlon value maximization duties, but they also create concerns about satisfaction of other fiduciary duties, such as remaining fully informed about potential offers. Recent rulings from the Delaware Court of Chancery have criticized the use of this standstill. My article attempts to address these criticisms and clarify how to properly use the standstill.

A Complete View Of The Cathedral: Claims Of Tortious Interference And The Specific Performance Remedy In Mergers And Acquisitions Litigation, Luke Nikas, Paul B. Maslo

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

A bank promises to lend several billion dollars to fund a buyer’s purchase of a target company. The buyer enters into a merger agreement with the target. Thereafter, the economy plummets, and the bank decides that breaching its contract with the buyer will cost less than performing. The buyer seeks specific performance. The target also sues the bank, alleging tortious interference with the merger agreement. Billions of dollars are on the line. This is the reality lived by many investment banks that committed to fund leveraged buyouts during the recent economic downturn. Most of these matters were resolved in private …

Antitrust’S State Action Doctrine And The Ordinary Powers Of Corporations, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has now agreed to review the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Phoebe-Putney, which held that a state statute permitting a hospital authority to acquire hospitals implicitly authorized such acquisitions when they were anticompetitive – in this particular case very likely facilitating a merger to monopoly. Under antitrust law’s “state action” doctrine a state may in fact authorize such an acquisition, provided that it “clearly articulates” its desire to approve an action that would otherwise constitute an antitrust violation and also “actively supervises” any private conduct that might fall under the state’s regulatory scheme.

“Authorization” in the context of …

Dispute Resolution As A Part Of Your Merger Or Your Acquisition Agreement, Kenneth Mathieu, Vincent (Trace) P. Schmeltz Iii

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Often overlooked until invoked, the dispute resolution provisions of an acquisition agreement frequently mirror the terms of a lawyer’s last deal. Yet such provisions—including purchase price adjustment clauses, the terms of governing earn-out disputes, and the contract sections outlining the indemnification claims process—often have long-term economic ramifications on the buyers and sellers. In working with corporate lawyers over the years, we have noted that corporate lawyers understand (and give intense thought to) the leverage their clients have, what their clients hope to accomplish in a transaction, and what makes long-term economic sense in drafting an agreement and negotiating more advantageous …

Standard Oil And U.S. Steel: Predation And Collusion In The Law Of Monopolization And Mergers, William H. Page

UF Law Faculty Publications

The Supreme Court’s 1911 decision in Standard Oil gave us embryonic versions of two foundational standards of liability under the Sherman Act: the rule of reason under Section 1 and the monopoly power/exclusionary conduct test under Section 2. But a case filed later in 1911, United States v. United States Steel Corporation, shaped the understanding of Standard Oil’s standards of liability for decades. U.S. Steel, eventually decided by the Supreme Court in 1920, upheld the 1901 merger that created "the Corporation," as U.S. Steel was known. The majority found that the efforts of the Corporation and its …

Markets In Merger Analysis, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Antitrust merger policy suffers from a disconnect between its articulated concerns and the methodologies it employs. The Supreme Court has largely abandoned the field of horizontal merger analysis, leaving us with ancient decisions that have never been overruled but whose fundamental approach has been ignored or discredited. As a result the case law reflects the structuralism of a bygone era, focusing on industrial concentration and market shares, largely to the exclusion of other measures of competitive harm, including price increases. Only within the last generation has econometrics developed useful techniques for estimating the price impact of specific mergers in differentiated …

Mergers, Market Dominance And The Lundbeck Case, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In Lundbeck the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court’s judgment that a merger involving the only two drugs approved for treating a serious heart condition in infants was lawful. Although the drugs treated the same condition they were not bioequivalents. The Eighth Circuit approved the district court’s conclusion that they had not been shown to be in the same relevant market.

Most mergers that are subject to challenge under the antitrust laws occur in markets that exhibit some degree of product differentiation. The Lundbeck case illustrates some of the problems that can arise when courts apply ideas derived from models …