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Cleaning Up The Corporate Opportunity Doctrine Mess: A First Principles Approach, Yifat Naftali Ben Zion

Washington and Lee Law Review

Almost a century ago, a legal dispute over who is the rightful owner of Pepsi-Cola, at the time an unknown syrup company on the verge of bankruptcy, led the Supreme Court of Delaware to develop what is now famously known as the corporate opportunity doctrine. This doctrine is the central framework Delaware courts use to this day to determine whether an officer who seized a business opportunity has breached his fiduciary duties. Despite the doctrine’s old roots, it has thus far failed to reach stable ground. For one, while many corporate law scholars have supported the rule developed following this …

The Federal Option: Delaware As A De Facto Agency, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington Law Review

Despite over 200 years of deliberation and debate, the United States has not adopted a federal corporate chartering law. Instead, Delaware is the “Federal Option” for corporate law and adjudication. The contemporary federal corporate chartering debate is, in part, a referendum on its role. Although the federal government has regulated other aspects of interstate commerce and has the power to charter corporations and preempt Delaware pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, it has not done so. Despite the rich and robust scholarly discussion of Delaware’s jurisdictional dominance, its role as a de facto national regulator remains underdeveloped. This Article addresses …

Delaware’S Dominance And The Future Of Organizational Law, Peter Molk

Georgia Law Review

Delaware dominates the market for business formations.
Two main theoretical explanations have been offered to justify
Delaware’s continued success. One focuses on the state’s
credible commitment to producing responsive organizational
law in the future. The other looks to the network effects that
continue to encourage new formations once Delaware already
dominates. Yet, other than continued observation of Delaware’s
dominance, little empirical support exists for either theory.
This Article empirically tests entrepreneurs’, investors’, and
lawyers’ appetite for Delaware’s credible commitment. I use the
recent Delaware Supreme Court decision of Gatz Properties v.
Auriga Capital Corp., which was a negative shock to …

The Lost Lessons Of Shareholder Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation, and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past. These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes. This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes in merger litigation and the longer history of …

Contract Design, Default Rules, And Delaware Corporate Law, Jeffrey Manns, Robert Anderson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Incomplete contract theory recognizes that contracts cannot be comprehensive and that state law necessarily has to fill in gaps when conflicts arise. The more complex the transaction, the more that lawyers face practical constraints that force them to limit the scope of drafting and broadly rely on legal defaults and open-ended terms to plug holes and address contingencies. In theory Delaware law serves as lawyers’ preferred jurisdiction and forum for merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions and other high-end corporate deals because of the state’s superior default rules for corporate law and its judiciary’s expertise in discerning the “hypothetical bargain” of …

Chancery’S Greatest Decision: Historical Insights On Civil Rights And The Future Of Shareholder Activism, Omari Scott Simmons

Washington and Lee Law Review

This article builds upon the author's remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on …

The Elephant In The Room: Helping Delaware Courts Develop Law To End Systemic Short-Term Bias In Corporate Decision-Making, Kenneth Mcneil, Keith Johnson

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Short-termism in corporate decision-making is as problematic for long-term investors as relying on a three-mile radar on a supertanker. It is totally inadequate for handling the long-term risks and opportunities faced by the modern corporation. Yet recent empirical research shows that up to 85% of the S&P 1500 have no long-term planning. This is costing pension funds and other long-term investors dearly. For instance, the small minority of companies that do long-term planning and risk management had a long-term profitability that was 81% higher than their peers during the 2001–2014 period—with less stock volatility that costs investors dearly as well. …

Solely Beneficial: How Benefit Corporations May Change The Duty Of Care Analysis For Traditional Corporate Directors In Delaware, Dustin Womack

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

Rather than adding to the voluminous literature assessing the necessity of benefit corporations themselves or the possible liability of their directors, this Note concerns itself only with how benefit corporations will impact the fiduciary duty of care analysis for the directors of traditional corporations constituted in the state of Delaware. Further, this Note is only concerned with liability arising from claims alleging that a day-to-day directorial decision resulted in a breach of the duty of care. As such, this Note does not address any other potential liability predicated on other situations or duties. Finally, this Note provides general background information …

Caremark's Hidden Promise, Ezra Wasserman Mitchell

Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review

In re Caremark, decided in 1996, established for the first time a director’s duty to monitor under Delaware law. A significant amount of jurisprudence and commentary has developed. Almost all of this literature parses the language of the case and those following, and disregards the underlying claims for damages. As a result of this linguistic focus, many have concluded that the duty to monitor largely is toothless and, importantly, deals only with claims of failure to monitor legal risk. A duty to monitor business risk has been disavowed.

Following the money reveals a different story. Classifying the cases according to …

The Seventeenth Annual Albert A. Destefano Lecture On Corporate, Securities & Financial Law At The Fordham Corporate Law Center, Caroline M. Gentile, The Honorable Karen L. Valihura

Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law

No abstract provided.

The "New" Fiduciary Standards Under The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act: More Bottom Bumping From Nccusl, Rutheford B. Campbell Jr.

Maine Law Review

Between 1995 and 2001, the influential National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) promulgated iterations of uniform laws pertaining to partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. One or more of those acts have been widely adopted by state legislatures. Each of the three acts—the Uniform Partnership Act (1997) (hereinafter RUPA), the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (2001) (hereinafter ULPA (2001)), and the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (1996) (hereinafter ULLCA) —contains identical fiduciary duty provisions. The acts all adopt the same standards for the duty of care and the duty of loyalty, and offer parties the same limited …

Lyman Johnson’S Invaluable Contribution To Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Jack B. Jacobs

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Contracting Out Of Fiduciary Duties In Llcs: Delaware Will Lead, But Will Anyone Follow?, H. Justin Pace

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Poison Pills: Recent Negative Economic Effects Justify Repealing The Related Legislation And Increasing Shareholder Ownership Rights, Wilton Robinson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Delaware Corporate Law Recognizes The Fundamental Validity Of The Forum Selection Bylaw: A Survey Of The Boilermakers Litigation, Zachary R. Cormier

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. represents a new and important chapter in the relationship between the forum selection clause and modern business relations. A forum selection clause is “[a] contractual provision in which the parties establish the place (such as the country, state, or type of court) for specified litigation between them.” Forum selection clauses have most often been analyzed by courts within contractual relationships between businesses, or a business and its customers. The Boilermakers case sets important precedent for forum selection in an equally fundamental business relationship--the corporation and its stockholders. This article will survey the …

Shareholder Wealth Maximization As Means To An End, Robert P. Bartlett, Iii

Seattle University Law Review

In several recent cases, the Delaware Chancery Court has emphasized that where a conflict of interest exists between holders of a company’s common stock and holders of its preferred stock, the standard of conduct for directors requires that they strive to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its common stockholders rather than for its preferred stockholders. This article interrogates this view of directors’ fiduciary duties from the perspective of incomplete contracting theory. Building on the seminal work of Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart, incomplete contracting theory examines the critical role of corporate control rights for addressing …

Team Production And Securities Laws, Urska Velikonja

Seattle University Law Review

In the seminal paper that this symposium celebrates, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout made two related points. First, that Delaware law does not require shareholder primacy in public corporations. Rather, the broad deference afforded to the decisions of predominantly independent corporate boards of directors is consistent with a contrary theory, that of team production, or, as they call it, “the mediating hierarch” theory. The fundamental role of the board of directors is to mediate between the interests of various stakeholders that contribute to the corporation’s output. As a result, Delaware courts have repeatedly …

With The Emergence Of Public Benefit Corporations, Directors Of Traditional For-Profit Companies Should Tread Cautiously, But Welcome The Opportunity To Invest In Social Enterprise, Mckenzie Holden Granum

Seattle University Law Review

Social entrepreneurship has become the popular term used to describe business forms that aim to produce profits while also seeking to significantly advance one or more social or environmental goals. In response to an increase in social entrepreneurship across sectors—from progressive industries like organic farming to conservative industries such as insurance and banking—several states have adopted new corporate governance structures. Such legislation allows incorporating businesses to choose an off-the-shelf formation type that embeds a social mission into its legal structure. The bulk of the newly implemented statutory forms provide not only a new framework for social entrepreneurs to work within, …

Fiduciary Duties Of Llc Managers: Are They Subject To Prospective Waiver Under The New York Llc Statute?, Jack Graves, Yelena Davydan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Lessons Of 2013: The Perils Of "Ready, Fire, Aim" And The Importance Of An Integrated Litigation Strategy In Corporate Governance Matters, Thad A. Davis, Leslie A. Wulff

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Fall 2013 Symposium: Contemporary Trends In Corporate Litigation, Robert Anderson Iv, Myron T. Steele, Katherine J. Blair, Thad A. Davis, James R. Griffin, James J. Moloney

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …

The Duty To Think Strategically, Nadelle Grossman

Louisiana Law Review

Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a duty to oversee their firm's management of risk to limit losses. Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to oversee their firm's management of strategy to create gains. Yet, managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm's management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law can drive firms to …

Delaware's Duty To Auction After Paramount Communications, Inc. V. Qvc Network, Inc., Robert D. Ming

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.

Agents Without Principals: Regulating The Duty Of Loyalty For Nonprofit Corporations Through The Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, Carly B. Eisenberg, Kevin Outterson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world--most prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and …

Delaware’S Balancing Act, John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins

Indiana Law Journal

Delaware’s courts and well-developed case law are widely seen as integral elements of Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations. However, as we show using empirical evidence involving reported judicial decisions and filed cases concerning large mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and options backdating, Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation is under threat. Today, a majority of shareholder suits involving Delaware companies are being brought and decided elsewhere. We examine in this Article the implications of this “out-of-Delaware” trend, emphasizing a difficult balancing act that Delaware faces. If Delaware accommodates litigation too readily, companies, fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere. …

The Delaware Series Llc: Sophisticated And Flexible Business Planning, Ann E. Conaway, Peter I. Tsoflias

Michigan Business & Entrepreneurial Law Review

The authors conclude that the Delaware series supplies a beneficial, efficient use of a combined contractual Delaware entity form when pooled with sensible, informed planning by sophisticated business attorneys. Such benefits are particularly noticeable in investment vehicles where managers embark to minimize risk by diversifying the fund’s assets or receive funding with specific covenants attached that limit the acceptable uses of the funds. The series is not, however, for general practitioners who have the occasional client wishing for the latest benefit Delaware has to offer its investors. To provide context, Parts II-IV of this article provide a brief overview of …

Meaningful Good Faith: Managerial Motives And The Duty To Obey The Law, Peter C. Kostant

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Failure Of A "Basic Assumption": The Emerging Standard For Excuse Under Mae Provisions, Nathan Somogie

Michigan Law Review

The onset of the current economic crisis has led many strategic and financial acquirers to reconsider the desirability of transactions to which they had previously agreed. Because many of these agreements contain substantial termination fees, buyers have increasingly sought to be excused from their contractual obligations by invoking Material Adverse Effect ("MAE") provisions. Reliance on MAE clauses as a basis for termination has historically been risky due to a lack of clarity in the case law regarding the standard for excuse under such provisions. A recent decision by the Delaware Chancery Court, Hexion v. Huntsman, the third in a …