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Conflicts Of Interest At An Organization’S Highest Authority: How The District Of Columbia’S Rules Of Professional Conduct Can Fail To Protect Private Organizations, Christopher Deubert
Conflicts Of Interest At An Organization’S Highest Authority: How The District Of Columbia’S Rules Of Professional Conduct Can Fail To Protect Private Organizations, Christopher Deubert
Catholic University Law Review
This Article examines how the District of Columbia’s incomplete incorporation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct into its own Rules of Professional Conduct has created a scenario in which wrongdoing inside a private organization can flourish. In 2002, following the Enron scandal, the American Bar Association (ABA) revisited and revised its Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The ABA nevertheless took a conservative route, rejecting rules long proposed by experts which would have permitted attorneys aware of corporate crimes, fraud, and other wrongdoing to report their concerns to individuals or entities outside the organization’s reporting structure. Additional scandals unfolded contemporaneous …
Attorney–Client Privilege In Bad Faith Insurance Claims: The Cedell Presumption And A Necessary National Resolution, Klien Hilliard
Attorney–Client Privilege In Bad Faith Insurance Claims: The Cedell Presumption And A Necessary National Resolution, Klien Hilliard
Seattle University Law Review
Attorney–client privilege is one of the most important aspects of our legal system. It is one of the oldest privileges in American law and is codified both at the national and state level. Applying to both individual persons and corporations, this expanded privilege covers a wide breadth of clients. However, this broad privilege can sometimes become blurred in relationships between the corporation and the individuals it serves. Specifically, insurance companies and those they cover have complex relationships, as the insurer possesses a quasi-fiduciary relationship in relation to the insured. This type of relationship requires that the insurer act in good …
The Privilege Doctrines--Are They Just Another Discovery Tool Utilized By The Tobacco Industry To Conceal Damaging Information?, Christine Hatfield
The Privilege Doctrines--Are They Just Another Discovery Tool Utilized By The Tobacco Industry To Conceal Damaging Information?, Christine Hatfield
Pace Law Review
This Comment will analyze the tobacco companies' use of the privilege doctrines to avoid litigation over the past thirty years, specifically focusing on the last fifteen years of litigation between this industry and its accusers. Part II of this Comment will discuss the pertinent discovery rules and the manner in which they are abused. Part III will examine the development, scope and limitations of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines, considering with particularity the corporate context and the applicability of the crime-fraud exception to these doctrines. Part IV will review the case law of the tobacco litigation, focusing on …
The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied To Corporate Clients, Elinore Marsh
The Attorney-Client Privilege As Applied To Corporate Clients, Elinore Marsh
Akron Law Review
After sixty-six years of struggle and controversy surrounding the application of the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients the United States Supreme Court has taken one step in laying many questions to rest. Upjohn Co. v. United States was accepted by the Court to resolve differences in the circuits as to how far the privilege extends horizontally and vertically within the corporate structure. This comment discusses the ramifications of extending the privilege to an entity which operates only through its agents, the history of the privilege, the effect of the Upjohn decision and the questions which remain as yet unsolved.
4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci
4th And 205: How A Rush Of Global Comments Blocked The Sec’S First Attempted Punt Of Attorney-Client Privilege Under Sarbanes-Oxley, John Paul Lucci
Touro Law Review
No abstract provided.
Pragmatic Selective Waiver: Re-Aligning Corporate Executives' Personal Interests With Those Of The Corporation Amidst Government Investigations, Erin M. Carter
Pragmatic Selective Waiver: Re-Aligning Corporate Executives' Personal Interests With Those Of The Corporation Amidst Government Investigations, Erin M. Carter
Vanderbilt Law Review
In the corporate setting, government investigators increasingly ask corporations to waive the attorney-client privilege as part of the "cooperation" necessary to receive incentives. In practice, however, these cooperation incentives have led to what has become known as a "culture of waiver," where waiver of the privilege in the face of investigation has become virtually essential. One way courts have sought to diminish the negative externalities of waiver is through the doctrine of selective waiver. Selective waiver allows the corporation to waive the attorney-client privilege, but only to the government agency during the course of the investigation, while still retaining the …
Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The Sec Enforcement Program, Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi
Evaluating The Mission: A Critical Review Of The History And Evolution Of The Sec Enforcement Program, Paul S. Atkins, Bradley J. Bondi
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
A Proposal For Protecting Executive Communications With Corporate Counsel After Corporate Client Has Waived Its Attorney-Client Privilege , John W. Gergacz
A Proposal For Protecting Executive Communications With Corporate Counsel After Corporate Client Has Waived Its Attorney-Client Privilege , John W. Gergacz
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act: The Prospect Of Congressional Intervention Into The Department Of Justice's Corporate Charging Policy, Andrew Gilman
Fordham Urban Law Journal
This Note analyzes the Privilege Protection Act, focusing on how it might change corporate white-collar prosecutions. Part I of this Note explores the mechanics of the corporate privilege, the development of the DOJ's waiver policy, and the structure of the Privilege Protection Act. Part II addresses the conflicting views on whether the Privilege Protection Act will bolster corporate attorney-client privilege, provide for the effective and efficient prosecution of white-collar crime, and promote ethical prosecutorial practices. Finally, Part III argues that the Privilege Protection Act is a misguided attempt to correct a greater systemic problem with the corporate attorney-client privilege and …
The Ethical Mine Field: Corporate Internal Investigations And Individual Assertions Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, Lawton P. Cummings
The Ethical Mine Field: Corporate Internal Investigations And Individual Assertions Of The Attorney-Client Privilege, Lawton P. Cummings
West Virginia Law Review
No abstract provided.
Panel Discussion: Bigger Carrots And Bigger Sticks: Issues And Developments In Corporate Sentencing, Jill E. Fisch, Hon. John S. Martin, Richard C. Breeden, Timothy Coleman, Stephen M. Cutler, Celeste Koeleveld, Richard H. Walker
Panel Discussion: Bigger Carrots And Bigger Sticks: Issues And Developments In Corporate Sentencing, Jill E. Fisch, Hon. John S. Martin, Richard C. Breeden, Timothy Coleman, Stephen M. Cutler, Celeste Koeleveld, Richard H. Walker
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
No abstract provided.
Ex Parte Interviews With Enterprise Employees: A Post-Upjohn Analysis, Louis A. Stahl
Ex Parte Interviews With Enterprise Employees: A Post-Upjohn Analysis, Louis A. Stahl
Washington and Lee Law Review
No abstract provided.
Conflicting Standards For Applying The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, Kay E. Stephenson
Conflicting Standards For Applying The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, Kay E. Stephenson
Vanderbilt Law Review
The attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between client and attorney from forced disclosure.' Dating back to at least 1577, the privilege arose from the belief that it was a point of honor for the attorney to keep his client's confidences.'The modern rationale for the privilege, however, is the perceived need to encourage full and frank discussion between attorney and client by removing the fear of forced disclosure.' Thus, the privilege rests on the premise that the social benefits derived from uninhibited communication and from the attorney's access to all the facts outweigh the detrimental effects of concealing information during trial.' …
Attorney-Client Privilege And Corporations, Richard C. Klein
Attorney-Client Privilege And Corporations, Richard C. Klein
Cleveland State Law Review
On August 3, 1962 a memorandum decision was handed down in an antitrust proceeding which startled practicing attorneys and text writers alike. It held specifically that the "attorney-client privilege" did not apply to the corporate client.' What had been accepted as law for over one hundred and twenty-five years was curtly cast aside by Chief Judge William J. Campbell.
Federal Civil Procedure-Discovery-Availability Of Attorney-Client Privilege To Corporations, Stephen M. Wittenberg
Federal Civil Procedure-Discovery-Availability Of Attorney-Client Privilege To Corporations, Stephen M. Wittenberg
Michigan Law Review
During the pre-trial stage of a civil antitrust suit, plaintiff sought inspection of certain documents in the files of the corporate defendants' outside counsel. The defendant contended that these documents were protected from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. Upon motion for inspection, held, granted. The attorney-client privilege is not available to any of the corporate parties in this action. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771, aff'd on rehearing, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. Ill. 1962).