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The Direct-Derivative Distinction, The Special Litigation Committee, And The Uniform Act: A Response To Professor Weidner, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

The Unfortunate Role of Special Litigation Committees in LLCs has a deeply pejorative view of the Uniform Law Commission “second generation” limited liability company act, and that view extends far deeper than the target suggested by the article’s title. The article’s fundamental attack is on the distinction between direct and derivative claims; the criticisms of ULLCA’s provisions on special litigation committees depend on that attack. In support of its wide-ranging attack, The Unfortunate Role seeks to marshal history, policy, logic, and a research study pertaining to the outcome of derivative claims. Unfortunately, however, the article (i) misapprehends the drafting history …

Minority Oppression And The Llc: Manere V. Collins, The Uniform Act, And Comment 701, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

For many decades, the law of closely-held businesses was the law of closely-held corporations. For entrepreneurs and attorneys, the corporate liability shield was the key desideratum, and before the advent of limited liability companies the corporation was essentially the only game in town. Unfortunately, for many decades the liability shield came with a potentially dangerous price for minority owners. The traditional corporate norms of majority rule, coupled with the minority shareholders’ inability to exit the enterprise, empowered majority shareholders to “oppress” minority shareholders or defeat such shareholders’ “reasonable expectations.” The “lock-in” phenomenon compounds the minority’s vulnerability; it is …

The Limited Effect Of “Maximum Effect”, Daniel S. Kleinberger, Douglas K. Moll

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Limited Liability Limited, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Limited liability companies went mainstream in 1988, began to capture the market for closely held businesses in 1997, and now have the lion’s share of that market. Since the advent of limited liability companies, a corporate-like liability shield, in addition to pass-through status under federal income tax law, has been one of two hallmarks of a limited liability company. Indeed, for many years courts have described the limited liability company as “a hybrid business entity [that] provides members with limited liability to the same extent enjoyed by corporate shareholders.”

The LLC shield should therefore be easy to understand: a limited …

What Is A Charging Order And Why Should A Business Lawyer Care?, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Suppose your client has a judgment from a court in state X against a shareholder of a closely held corporation organized under the law of state X. You know that your client can levy on the judgment debtor’s shares to enforce the judgment and either obtain the shares (and attendant voting and economic rights) or trigger a pre-existing buy-out agreement with the shareholders or the corporation, which will replace the judgment debtor’s shares with right to payment. The relevant civil procedures may be complicated (or even arcane), but in theory your client’s remedy is straightforward.

Now suppose that the judgment …

We Interrupt This Program...To Talk Of Transfer Restrictions, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

A recent Iowa decision, REG Washington, LLC v. Iowa Renewable Energy LLC, is a useful first word on transfer restrictions applicable to ownership interests in a limited liability company, and more particularly transfer restrictions applicable to so-called transferable interests, i.e., economic rights. The decision’s analysis centers around the “pick your partner” principle and expressly rejects any analogy to corporate law cases addressing stock transfer restrictions. The decision raises certain issues and is hardly the last word on this topic.

No Longer Peas In A Pod: More Implications Of The Divorce Of Minnesota Corporate And Llc Law, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Twenty-five years ago, when an MSBA task force drafted Minnesota’s first limited liability company(LLC) statute, the drafters copied chapter 302A, the corporate statute, to the maximum extent possible. Labels were changed—e.g., member instead of shareholder; board of governors instead of board of directors— and substance was modified to the extent necessary to comply with the then-applicable tax classification regulations. But otherwise, the task was an exercise in replication.

The approach was far out of the mainstream. Almost everywhere else LLC statutes were being derived from partnership law. The task force’s rationale for going rogue was straightforward. At the time, most …

How Can I Be A Party To A Contract And Yet Lack Standing To Sue Another Party For Breach?, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

The distinction between direct and derivative claims follows necessarily from the concept of a legal person being separate and distinct from its owners, raises and resolves a question of standing, has serious practical consequences in litigation, and is central to the governance of any business entity. In a closely held business, the distinction usually protects the deal the owners have made for themselves. On some occasions, however, the distinction helps shelter a miscreant majority owner who has managed to harm a fellow owner indirectly.

This column will briefly describe the three approaches to the direct-derivative distinction found in the case …

Protecting The Sacred Writing: The Operating Agreement, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This column provides practical steps toward protecting an LLC's written operating agreement from claims of oral or implied-in-fact modification. Such claims undercut the purpose of “reducing the agreement to writing,” replacing definiteness with uncertainty and substituting swearing matches for the written word.

Like Great Britain, A Limited Liability Company May Have An Unwritten Constitution, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Don’T Dabble In Delaware, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

When a litigator argues for a particular choice of law, the litigator seeks retrospectively the law most favorable to a particular claim or claims. When a business lawyer chooses a state of formation for a business entity, the lawyer seeks prospectively the governing law whose characteristics most favor the client’s interests.

Although in particular situations one characteristic may dominate, in general the business lawyer should look for governing law that is clear, comprehensive, coherent, accessible, and stable (or at least predictable). With these five metrics in mind, this column explains why lawyers forming limited liability companies should not dabble in …

Delineating The Implied Covenant And Providing For “Good Faith”, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This column considers whether an operating or partnership agreement can delineate the implied contractual obligation, comparing ULLCA and the Delaware Act, and then warns of the dangers of carelessly imposing by contract an express requirement of "good faith."

Series Of Unincorporated Business Entities: The Mobius Strip And Klein Bottle Of Business Entity Law, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

Back in the day – say, 1990 – limited liability companies (LLCs) were the cutting edge of business entity law. Today, LLCs dominate entity formation, and the cutting edge has moved further out – to the notion of a “series,” a quasi-separate, quasi-person existing within an LLC.

Business lawyers are generally familiar with series of stocks and bonds, but those series have nothing to do with the LLC series discussed in this article. To avoid confusion, this article refers to protected series, which, as we will see, are the Mobius strips or Klein bottles of entity law.

Delaware’S Implied Contractual Covenant Of Good Faith And “Sibling Rivalry” Among Equity Holders, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

An obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every common law contract and is codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C”). The terminology differs: Some jurisdictions refer to an “implied covenant;” others to an “implied contractual obligation;” still others to an “implied duty.” But whatever the label, the concept is understood by the vast majority of U.S. lawyers as a matter of commercial rather than entity law. And, to the vast majority of corporate lawyers, “good faith” does not mean contract law but rather conjures up an important aspect of a corporate director’s duty of loyalty.

Nonetheless, …

Is The Delaware Court Of Chancery Going “Objective” On Us? Or Policemen’S Annuity And Benefit Fund Of Chicago V. Dv Realty Advisors Llc: More Delaware Permutations On Good Faith, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

The Chancery Court’s opinion in Policemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago v. DV Realty Advisors LLC, C.A. No. 7204-VCN, 2012 WL 3548206 (Del. Ch. Aug. 16, 2012) is thought provoking for at least two reasons. The first is somewhat technical and concerns the relationship between a partnership agreement’s reference to “good faith” and the implied covenant of good faith. The second concerns what appears to be yet another Delaware permutation on the meaning of “good faith.”

Due to the opinion’s treatment of the covenant, it seems possible (though hardly desirable) for two different standards of good faith to apply …

Aba Business Law Section, On Behalf Of Its Committees On Llcs And Nonprofit Organizations, Opposes Legislation For Low Profit Limited Liability Companies (L3cs), Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This document comprises a letter and attachment “submitted by the ABA Business Law Section on behalf of its Committee on Limited Liability Companies, Partnerships, and Unincorporated Entities and its Committee on Nonprofit Organizations … and states our views on … a bill ‘relating to limited liability companies [and] providing for the creation and operation of low-profit limited liability companies.’” The letter and attachment “have not been approved by the House of Delegates or the Board of Governors of the American Bar Association and should not be construed as representing the policy of the ABA.”

Supported by detailed analysis of both …

Donahue's Fils Aîné: Reflections On Wilkes And The Legitimate Rights Of Selfish Ownership, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This Article asserts that Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc. should be at least as memorable as Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., and is, in a practical sense, substantially more important. The assertion rests on two propositions: first, that Donahue announces admirable sentiments but provides little practical guidance; second, that Wilkes provides the best practical rule for adjudicating “oppression” claims when the alleged victim is also a miscreant or for some other reason the dispute is grey rather than black and white. In particular, this Article asserts that Wilkes’s multistep, burden-shifting rule is a nuanced and effective method for accommodating …

Governance In The Public Corporation Of The Future: The Battle For Control Of Corporate Governance, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Eight years after passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Congress has again passed sweeping legislation in response to a corporate crisis. In addition to changes in the regulatory environment for Wall Street financial firms and banks, the Dodd-Frank Act (D-F Act) also proposes reforms to corporate governance.

In this article, the author examines the latest governance mandates under the D-F Act. In particular, this article focuses on the disclosure requirements on the CEO and chairman positions, and argues that disclosures of whether the CEO is also the chairman benefit shareholders' governance rights under state law. The new provisions under D-F Act …

The Fatal Design Defects Of L3cs, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This article argues that the L3C is an unnecessary and unwise contrivance, and it's very existence is inherently misleading. The notion that an L3C should have privileged status under the Internal Revenue Code (known as the Code) for access to tax-exempt foundation resources is inescapably at odds with the key policies that underpin the relevant Code sections, and L3Cs are not on track-let alone on a fast track-to receive special status under the Code. An ordinary limited liability company (LLC) can perform precisely the same functions proclaimed of L3Cs. In addition, because of technical flaws, the L3C legislation adopted to …

To Be Or Not To Be Both Ceo And Board Chair, Thuy-Nga T. Vo

Faculty Scholarship

Part I of this article discusses the management and monitoring responsibilities of the board of directors. Part II explores the duality governance structure and its prevalence in corporate America. In Part III, the article examines and weighs the theoretical arguments for and against duality. Based on these arguments, this part assesses the impact of combined or separate CEO and Chair positions on the board’s performance of its management and monitoring responsibilities. Part IV turns to the empirical data on the effect of combined, rather than separate, CEO-Chair roles on corporate performance. Part V explains the views of corporate stakeholders on …

When The Law Is Understood—L3c No, Daniel S. Kleinberger, J. William Callison

Faculty Scholarship

The November, 2009 issue of Community Dividend, included an article entitled “The L3C: A new business model for socially responsible investing.” The article spoke enthusiastically about “[t]he low-profit limited liability company, or L3C, …a newly developed form of business that blends attributes of nonprofit and for-profit organizations in order to promote investment in socially responsible objectives.”

We understand the enthusiasm; proponents of the L3C have predicted dramatic benefits. However, after careful study of the relevant law, we have concluded that the enthusiasm is misplaced. The L3C concept is fundamentally flawed, potentially dangerous, and at best counterproductive.

We also understand that …

The Single Member Limited Liability Company As Disregarded Entity: Now You See It, Now You Don’T, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

The power and complexity of the single member limited liability company (“SMLLC”) comes from a conceptual contradiction: the conflation of owner and organization for tax purposes and the separation of owner and entity for non-tax, state law purposes. The contraction has significant practical consequences, which this article explores and illustrates, considering: • The SMLLC in federal court (single member not permitted to represent the LLC) • The IRS’s tortuous path to determining whether an SMLLC’s sole member is liable for the SMLLC’s unpaid employment taxes (yes; yes vindicated by the courts; then no, as a matter of policy) • Transfer …

A Myth Deconstructed: “The Emperor’S New Clothes” On The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

This article carefully debunks each major tenet of the L3C “movement” and reveals the legal and practical realities under “the Emperor’s New Clothes.” Using foundation funds to offer market-rate returns to “tranched” investors is, at best, a complicated device; not appropriate for “branding” and simplistic appeals to social conscience. When a foundation contemplates making a program-related investment, the matter requires careful, individualized, professional assessment, not reliance on a branded template. In this context, the L#C is but a snare and a delusion.

An Smllc Conundrum: Disregarded For Federal Tax Purposes But Not In Federal Court, Carter G. Bishop, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

In Federal Court, the only member of a SMLLC may not represent the SMLLC unless that owner is also a lawyer. To do so exposes the SMLLC to dismissal as well as the owner to the unauthorized practice of law. The article explores the implications of these rules to small closely held LLCs.

The Plight Of The Bare Naked Assignee, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

A new and separate opportunity for oppression exists because LLC law purports to (1) recognize a species of persons holding legal rights vis-á-vis the LLC (assignees) while (2) denying those persons any remedies whatsoever in connection with those rights. This article addresses the conceptual mechanics, history, and ultimate instability of that denial. The article also considers a note of irony­—namely, that the plight of the "bare naked assignee" derives from a construct, the organization as "aggregate," that LLC law has in all other respects emphatically transcended. To understand the plight of the assignee of an LLC interest, one must first …

Finessing Well-Plead Derivative Lawsuits: The Implications Of The Minnesota Supreme Court's Selection Of Auerbach Over Zapata, James F. Hogg

Faculty Scholarship

This article begins with the factual background and subsequent procedural history of the UnitedHealth Group Inc. shareholder derivitve litigation, as an instance where Minnesota courts effectively disposed of the factual allegations in a well-pleaded derivative action, directed at the behavior and actions of members of a board of directors, without reviewing finding of facts or reasoning behind the SLC's report or conclusions. The purpose of this article is to understand how a board-appointed committee can convince a court to dismiss and settle a derivative suit without showing detailed justification, and this is achieved by reviewing the statutes, case law, and …

Preventive Law: A Strategy For Internal Corporate Lawyers To Advise Managers Of Their Ethical Obligations, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines the efficacy of Preventive Law jurisprudence to internal corporate law practice. The article compares internal corporate law practice to the practice approach of Preventive Law. The article explores the benefits of Preventive Law jurisprudence to internal corporate law practice. Part I discusses the history and various vectors of Preventive Law. Part II examines the responsibilities of corporate law departments. Part III compares Preventive Law practice skills to internal corporate law practice, and explores the utility of Barton’s problem solving approaches to internal corporate law practice. Finally, the article concludes arguing internal corporate law practice is Preventive Law …

Fuzzy Logic And Corporate Governance Theories, Z. Jill Barclift

Faculty Scholarship

Fuzzy logic is a theory that categorizes concepts or things belonging to more than one group. A methodology that explains how things function in multiple groups (not fully in one group or another) offers advantages when one definition or membership in a group accounts for belonging to multiple groups. A principal/agent model of corporate governance has some characterizations of fuzzy logic theory. The purpose of this article it to evaluate other models of corporate governance that account for the multi-agent role of senior officers of public companies and assess the accountability to the corporation. Corporate governance theorists continue to debate …

Agents Of The Good, Servants Of Evil: Harry Potter And The Law Of Agency, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Careful What You Wish For — Freedom Of Contract And The Necessity Of Careful Scrivening, Daniel S. Kleinberger

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.