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Executives And Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation Of Incentive Compatibility, David M. Schizer
Executives And Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation Of Incentive Compatibility, David M. Schizer
Faculty Scholarship
Options are granted to executives to inspire better performance by tying pay to the employer's stock price. Yet this incentive rationale no longer holds if executives can use the derivatives market to simulate a sale of their options, a practice known as hedging. This Article evaluates the effectiveness of existing legal constraints on hedging by executives, including limits derived from contract, securities and tax law. Although investment bankers have been searching for ways around these constraints, the bottom line is that, at least for now, executives are unable to hedge option grants: While contractual limits are rare, the securities law …
The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch
The Direction Of Corporate Law: The Scholars' Perspective, John C. Coffee Jr., Richard A. Booth, R. Franklin Balotti, David C. Mcbride, Edward P. Welch
Faculty Scholarship
MR. BALOTTI: Good afternoon. My name is Frank Balotti and I've been asked to be the moderator for this afternoon's program. And one of the privileges that I get is to introduce the panel and to call them up to speak in some kind of order, I hope. And I hope that you and the audience will participate by asking questions towards the end of our panel and get involved in the discussion which we hope to promote.
The topic for this afternoon's panel is a scholar's approach to corporation law. And we are fortunate to have some scholars with …
Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation For Continuous Improvement In The Global Workplace, Charles F. Sabel, Dara O'Rourke, Archon Fung
Ratcheting Labor Standards: Regulation For Continuous Improvement In The Global Workplace, Charles F. Sabel, Dara O'Rourke, Archon Fung
Faculty Scholarship
It is a brute fact of contemporary globalization – unmistakable as activists and journalists catalog scandal after scandal – that the very transformations making possible higher quality, cheaper products often lead to unacceptable conditions of work: brutal use of child labor, dangerous environments, punishingly long days, starvation wages, discrimination, suppression of expression and association. In all quarters, the question is not whether to address these conditions, but how.
That question, however, admits no easy answers. Globalization itself has freed capital from many of its former constraints – national workplace standards, collective bargaining, and supervisory state agencies and courts – designed …
Poison Pills And The European Case, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Poison Pills And The European Case, Jeffrey N. Gordon
Faculty Scholarship
Professor Coates has given us a welcome opportunity to revisit the question of shareholder rights plans, or poison pills. It is interesting to evaluate a revisionist's view of an important empirical debate – but less because of the role that empirical evidence may have played in the evolution of U.S. corporate law doctrine and more because of the relevance of that debate to a world, especially Europe, that is waking up to the vigorous market in corporate control. If contested takeovers involving target firms such as Gucci, Telecom Italia, Paribas, and Mannesman are headline grabbing events in 1999 and 2000, …
Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller
Corporate Governance Lessons From Russian Enterprise Fiascoes, Merritt B. Fox, Michael A. Heller
Faculty Scholarship
This Article draws on a rich array of deviant behavior in Russian enterprises to craft lessons for corporate governance theory. First, Professors Fox and Heller define corporate governance by looking to the economic functions of the firm. Based on this definition, they develop a typology that comprehensively shows all the channels through which bad corporate governance can inflict damage on a country's real economy. Second, they explain the causes of Russian enterprise fiascoes by looking to the particular initial conditions prevailing at privatization – untenable firm boundaries and insider allocation of firm shares – and the bargaining dynamics that have …
Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr.
Convergence And Its Critics: What Are The Preconditions To The Separation Of Ownership And Control?, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Recent commentary has argued that deep and liquid securities markets and a dispersed shareholder base are unlikely to develop in civil law countries and transitional economies for a variety of reasons, including (1) the absence of adequate legal protections for minority shareholder, (2) the inability of dispersed shareholders to hold control or pay an equivalent control premium to that which a prospective controlling shareholder will pay and (3) the political vulnerability of dispersed shareholder ownership in left-leaning "social democracies." Nonetheless, this article finds that significant movement in the direction of dispersed ownership has occurred and is accelerating across Europe. To …
Trade Secrets And Mutual Investments, Gillian L. Lester, Eric L. Talley
Trade Secrets And Mutual Investments, Gillian L. Lester, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
This paper employs an optimal contracting framework to study the question of how courts should adjudicate disputes over valuable trade secrets (such as customer lists). We focus principally on contexts where trade secrets are formed endogenously, through specific, non-contractible investments that could potentially come from either employers or employees (or both). Within such contexts, we argue, an "optimal" trade secret law diverges in many important respects from existing doctrine. In particular, an optimal doctrine would (1) expressly consider the parties' relative skills at making value enhancing investments rather than the mere existence of a valuable informational asset; (2) tend to …
The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Ronald J. Mann
The Role Of Letters Of Credit In Payment Transactions, Ronald J. Mann
Faculty Scholarship
Common justifications for the use of the letter of credit fail to explain its widespread use. The classic explanation claims that the letter of credit provides an effective assurance of payment from a financially responsible third party. In that story, the seller – a Taiwanese clothing manufacturer, for example – fears that the overseas buyer – Wal-Mart – will refuse to pay once the goods have been shipped. Cross-border transactions magnify the concern, because the difficulties of litigating in a distant forum will hinder the manufacturer's efforts to force the distant buyer to pay. The manufacturer-seller solves that problem by …