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Transparency, Risk, And Managerial Actions, Gwendolyn Pennywell
Transparency, Risk, And Managerial Actions, Gwendolyn Pennywell
Finance Dissertations
I investigate the relation between firm risk and firm transparency over the period 1992-2006 and find that the level of firm transparency and the level of firm risk are negatively related. I also find that higher CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) works to mitigate this inverse relationship. This result is consistent with Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) who suggest that managers reduce risk to protect their pay and performance evaluations under higher levels of firm transparency. I further find that firms in high technology industries are more likely to increase risk relative to firms in other industries when transparency is high. Finally, …
Essay 1: 'An Examination Of The Efficiency, Foreclosure, And Collusion Rationales For Vertical Takeovers' Essay 2: 'Determinants Of Firm Vertical Boundaries And Implications For Internal Capital Markets', Jaideep Ranjal Shenoy
Essay 1: 'An Examination Of The Efficiency, Foreclosure, And Collusion Rationales For Vertical Takeovers' Essay 2: 'Determinants Of Firm Vertical Boundaries And Implications For Internal Capital Markets', Jaideep Ranjal Shenoy
Finance Dissertations
Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical Takeovers We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers. Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a …
Ceo Risk Taking And Firm Policies: Evidence From Ceo Employment History, Lingling Wang
Ceo Risk Taking And Firm Policies: Evidence From Ceo Employment History, Lingling Wang
Finance Dissertations
I propose that CEO employment history is an observable characteristic that reveals the CEO’s unobservable risk-taking preferences. I hypothesize that CEOs that change employers more frequently (mobile CEOs) have a propensity to bear risk and implement riskier firm policies. Using a sample of S&P 1500 CEOs, I find that firms are more likely to hire mobile CEOs when the firm’s prior risk is high, firm-specific human capital is less important, the prior CEO turnover is forced, the prior CEO has a shorter tenure and the board is smaller and has fewer insiders. Mobile CEOs increase financial leverage, invest more in …