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Persuasion, Political Warfare, And Deterrence: Behavioral And Behaviorally Robust Models, William N. Caballero
Persuasion, Political Warfare, And Deterrence: Behavioral And Behaviorally Robust Models, William N. Caballero
Theses and Dissertations
This dissertation examines game theory models in the context of persuasion and competition wherein decision-makers are not completely rational by considering two complementary threads of research. The first thread of research pertains to offensive and preemptively defensive behavioral models. Research in this thread makes three notable contributions. First, an offensive modeling framework is created to identify how an entity optimally influences a populace to take a desired course of action. Second, a defensive modeling framework is defined wherein a regulating entity takes action to bound the behavior of multiple adversaries simultaneously attempting to persuade a group of decision-makers. Third, an …
Discounting And Criminals' Implied Risk Preferences, Murat C. Mungan, Jonathan Klick
Discounting And Criminals' Implied Risk Preferences, Murat C. Mungan, Jonathan Klick
All Faculty Scholarship
It is commonly assumed that potential offenders are more responsive to increases in the certainty than increases in the severity of punishment. An important implication of this assumption within the Beckerian law enforcement model is that criminals are risk-seeking. This note adds to existing literature by showing that offenders who discount future monetary benefits can be more responsive to the certainty rather than the severity of punishment, even when they are risk averse, and even when their disutility from imprisonment rises proportionally (or more than proportionally) with the length of the sentence.