Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
- Publication Type
Articles 1 - 2 of 2
Full-Text Articles in Entire DC Network
Spoiling The Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regulatory Inspections In Japan And The United States, Andrew Chin
Spoiling The Surprise: Constraints Facing Random Regulatory Inspections In Japan And The United States, Andrew Chin
Andrew Chin
This Article is organized as follows. Part I presents a rational actor model of legal compliance under an enforcement regime based on random inspections and identifies two classes of reforms that can be applied in combination to improve aggregate compliance. Part II introduces the problem of corrupt tip-offs into the model and argues that exogenous reforms are necessary to combat corruption. Part III surveys the use of random administrative inspections in the United States, reviews the approaches taken by four such programs to improve compliance and fight corruption, and describes the various constraints under which they must operate. Part IV …
A Story Of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial Management Regulation, And Fiduciary Law, Tamar Frankel
A Story Of Three Bank-Regulatory Legal Systems: Contract, Financial Management Regulation, And Fiduciary Law, Tamar Frankel
Faculty Scholarship
How should banks be regulated to avoid their failure? Banks must control the risks they take with depositors' money. If depositors lose their trust in their banks, and demand their money, the banks will fail. This article describes three legal bank regulatory systems: Contract with depositors (U.S.); a mix of contract and trust law, but going towards trust (Japan), and a full trust-fiduciary law regulating banks (Israel). The article concludes that bank regulation, which limits the banks' risks and conflicts of interest, helps create trustworthy banks that serve their country best.