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When Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others, Steve Clarke
When Some Animals Are More Equal Than Others, Steve Clarke
Animal Sentience
Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that we should attribute moral standing not only to vertebrates but also to certain invertebrates. M&P also object on ethical grounds to policies of scientific funding agencies that encourage scientists to replace vertebrates by invertebrates in research. M&P do allow that some invertebrates with brains may have lower levels of moral status than some vertebrates, but this seems to conflict with their case against replacement policies.
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill
Animal Sentience
We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for …