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Symposium On Justin Remhof's Nietzsche's Constructivism: A Metaphysics Of Material Objects (Routledge, 2018), Justin Remhof
Symposium On Justin Remhof's Nietzsche's Constructivism: A Metaphysics Of Material Objects (Routledge, 2018), Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Like Kant, the German Idealists, and many neo-Kantian philosophers before him, Nietzsche was persistently concerned with metaphysical questions about the nature of objects. His texts often address questions concerning the existence and non-existence of objects, the relation of objects to human minds, and how different views of objects impact commitments in many areas of philosophy―not just metaphysics, but also language, epistemology, science, logic and mathematics, and even ethics. In this book, Remhof presents a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Nietzsche’s material object metaphysics. He argues that Nietzsche embraces the controversial constructivist view that all concrete objects are socially constructed. Reading …
Truths, Facts, And Liars, Peter Marton
Truths, Facts, And Liars, Peter Marton
Philosophy Faculty Publications
A Moderate Anti-realist (MAR) approach to truth and meaning, built around the concept of knowability, will be introduced and argued for in this essay. Our starting point will be the two fundamental anti-realists principles that claim that neither truth nor meaning can outstrip knowability and our focus will be on the challenge of adequately formalizing these principles and incorporating them into a formal theory. Accordingly, the author will introduce a MAR truth operator that is built on a distinction between being true and being factual. He will show then that this approach partitions propositions into eight classes, on the basis …
A New Peircean Response To Radical Skepticism, Justin Remhof
A New Peircean Response To Radical Skepticism, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
The radical skeptic argues that I have no knowledge of things I ordinarily claim to know because I have no evidence for or against the possibility of being systematically fed illusions. Recent years have seen a surge of interest in pragmatic responses to skepticism inspired by C.S. Peirce. This essay challenges one such influential response and presents a better Peircean way to refute the skeptic. The account I develop holds that although I do not know whether the skeptical hypothesis is true, I still know things I ordinarily claim to know. It will emerge that although this reply appears similar …
Nietzsche And James On The Value Of Constructing Objects, Justin Remhof
Nietzsche And James On The Value Of Constructing Objects, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this paper, I first suggest that Nietzsche and James, two otherwise very different thinkers, both endorse the controversial constructivist view that human representational practices bring all material objects into existence. I then explore their views concerning why and how constructivism can play a vital role in helping us find reality and our lives valuable.
Scientific Fictionalism And The Problem Of Inconsistency In Nietzsche, Justin Remhof
Scientific Fictionalism And The Problem Of Inconsistency In Nietzsche, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
In this article, I begin to develop Nietzsche’s scientific fictionalism in order to make headway toward resolving a central interpretive issue in his epistemology. For Nietzsche knowledge claims are falsifications. Presumably, this is a result of his puzzling view that truths are somehow false. I argue that Nietzsche thinks knowledge claims are falsifications because he embraces a scientific fictionalist view according to which inexact representations, which are false, can also be accurate, or true, and that this position is not inconsistent.
Nietzsche's Conception Of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence Or Pragmatist?, Justin Remhof
Nietzsche's Conception Of Truth: Correspondence, Coherence Or Pragmatist?, Justin Remhof
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Nearly every common theory of truth has been attributed to Nietzsche, while some commentators have argued that he simply has no theory of truth. This essay argues that Nietzsche’s remarks on truth are better situated within either the coherence or pragmatist theories of truth than the correspondence theory. Nietzsche’s thoughts conflict with the correspondence framework because he believes that the truth conditions of propositions are constitutively dependent on our actions.
Logic, Truth And Inquiry (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Logic, Truth And Inquiry (Book Review), G. C. Goddu
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Mark Weinstein’s, Logic, Truth and Inquiry is an ambitious and provocative case for a theory of truth and warrant strength that will undergird an “account of argument in the broad sense of current argumentation theory” (p. 12). I begin with a very schematic synopsis of Weinstein’s rich discussion through his six chapters. Weinstein himself notes that his arguments are “frequently presented in broad outline” (p. 1), so my quick sketch will be even broader. I conclude with some brief observations about both what the book leaves unresolved and the merits of Weinstein’s intriguing book.
Propositional Quantification, Ryan Christensen
Propositional Quantification, Ryan Christensen
Philosophy Faculty Publications
Ramsey deWned truth in the following way: xz is true if and only if 'pzz(xz = [zpz] & pz). This deWnition is ill-formed in standard Wrst-order logic, so it is normally interpreted using substitutional or some kind of higher-order quanti-Wer. I argue that these quantiWers fail to provide an adequate reading of the deWnition, but that, given certain adjustments, standard objectual quantiWcation does provide an adequate reading.