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Perelman's Theory Of Argumentation And Natural Law, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Chaim Perelman resuscitated the rhetorical tradition by developing an elegant and detailed theory of argumentation. Rejecting the single-minded Cartesian focus on rational truth, Perelman recovered the ancient wisdom that we can argue reasonably about matters that admit only of probability. From this one would conclude that Perelman’s argumentation theory is inalterably opposed to natural law, and therefore that I would have done better to have written an article titled “Perelman’s Th eory of Argumentation as a Rejection of Natural Law.”

However, my thesis is precisely that Perelman’s theory of argumentation connects to the natural law tradition in interesting and productive …

Argument, Political Friendship And Rhetorical Knowledge: A Review Of Garver's "For The Sake Of Argument", Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Gene Garver's recent book, "For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character and the Ethics of Belief" (U. Chicago Press, 2004), responds to the dilemma at the core of contemporary legal theory. Garver incisively describes why legal reasoning is viewed either as impotent or dangerous. Reason appears impotent in the legal context to the extent that we maintain its rigor by limiting its scope to dialectical demonstration; it appears dangerous to the extent that we free reason from having to provide definitive answers. Garver looks to Aristotle for a solution. To deal with the inadequacies of the accounts of practical …

Rhetorical Knowledge In Legal Practice And Theory, Francis J. Mootz Iii

Scholarly Works

Rhetorical Knowledge in Legal Practice and Critical Legal Theory has just been published by the University of Alabama Press as part of its series, Rhetoric, Culture and Social Critique. My central themes are that rhetorical knowledge - however imperfectly pursued and attained - is a feature of social life; that rhetorical knowledge plays an important role in legal practice; and that legal critique is appropriately grounded by the normative injunction to maximize the generation of and reliance on rhetorical knowledge in the administration of justice by legal actors. If nothing else, I want to make clear that by recovering and …