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The Paradox Of Christian-Based Political Advocacy: A Reply To Professor Calhoun, Wayne R. Barnes Mar 2019

The Paradox Of Christian-Based Political Advocacy: A Reply To Professor Calhoun, Wayne R. Barnes

Wayne R. Barnes

Professor Calhoun, in his Article around which this symposium is based, has asserted that it is permissible for citizens to publicly argue for laws or public policy solutions based on explicitly religious reasons. Calhoun candidly admits that he has “long grappled” with this question (as have I, though he for longer), and, in probably the biggest understatement in this entire symposium, notes that Professor Kent Greenawalt identified this as “a particularly significant, debatable, and highly complex problem.” Is it ever. I have a position that I will advance in this article, but I wish to acknowledge at the outset that …

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Reconsidering Christianity As A Support For Secular Law: A Final Reply To Professor Calhoun, Wayne R. Barnes Mar 2019

Reconsidering Christianity As A Support For Secular Law: A Final Reply To Professor Calhoun, Wayne R. Barnes

Wayne R. Barnes

This symposium has revolved around Professor Calhoun’s article, which posits that it is completely legitimate, in proposing laws and public policies, to argue for them in the public square based on overtly religious principles. In my initial response, I took issue with his argument that no reasons justify barring faith-based arguments from the public square argument. In fact, I do find reasons justifying the prohibition of “faith-based,” or Christian, arguments in the public square—and, in fact, I find such reasons within Christianity itself. This is because what is being publicly communicated in Christian political argumentation is that if citizens comply …

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Separation Of Church And State: Jefferson, Lincoln, And The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended To Separate Religion From Politics, Samuel W. Calhoun Jan 2019

Separation Of Church And State: Jefferson, Lincoln, And The Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended To Separate Religion From Politics, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

This Essay argues that it’s perfectly fine for religious citizens to openly bring their faith-based values to public policy disputes. Part II demonstrates that the Founders, exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, never intended to separate religion from politics. Part III, focusing upon Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to slavery, shows that religion and politics have been continuously intermixed ever since the Founding. Part IV, emphasizing the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., argues that no other reasons justify barring faith-based arguments from the public square.

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Getting The Framers Wrong: A Response To Professor Geoffrey Stone, Samuel W. Calhoun Jan 2013

Getting The Framers Wrong: A Response To Professor Geoffrey Stone, Samuel W. Calhoun

Samuel W. Calhoun

Professor Geoffrey Stone’s Essay, The World of the Framers: A Christian Nation?, seeks to state “the truth about . . . what [the Framers] believed, and about what they aspired to when they created this nation.” Doing so will accomplish Professor Stone’s main objective, helping us to understand what “the Constitution allows” on a host of controversial public policy issues.3 Regrettably, Professor Stone’s effort is unsuccessful. Although he clearly tried to be fair in his historical account,4 the Essay ultimately presents a misleading view of the Framers’ perspective on the proper relationship between religion and the state.

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Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks And Transparency, Mark Fenster Feb 2012

Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks And Transparency, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Constitutional, criminal, and administrative laws regulating government transparency, and the theories that support them, rest on the assumption that the disclosure of information has transformative effects: disclosure can inform, enlighten, and energize the public, or it can create great harm or stymie government operations. To resolve disputes over difficult cases, transparency laws and theories typically balance disclosure’s beneficial effects against its harmful ones. WikiLeaks and its vigilante approach to massive document leaks challenge the underlying assumption about disclosure’s effects in two ways. First, WikiLeaks’s ability to receive and distribute leaked information cheaply, quickly, and seemingly unstoppably enables it to bypass …

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Bad News For John Marshall, David B. Kopel, Gary Lawson Dec 2011

Bad News For John Marshall, David B. Kopel, Gary Lawson

David B Kopel

In Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, we demonstrated that the individual mandate’s forced participation in commercial transactions cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause as the Clause was interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland. Professor Andrew Koppelman’s response, Bad News for Everybody, wrongly conflates that argument with a wide range of interpretative and substantive positions that are not logically entailed by taking seriously the requirement that laws enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be incidental to an enumerated power. His response is thus largely unresponsive to our actual arguments.

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The U.N. Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice, Or Judicially-Constructed “Victor’S Impunity”?, C. Peter Erlinder Dec 2009

The U.N. Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice, Or Judicially-Constructed “Victor’S Impunity”?, C. Peter Erlinder

C. Peter Erlinder

ABSTRACT The U.N. Security Council Ad Hoc Rwanda Tribunal: International Justice, or Juridically-Constructed “Victor’s Impunity”? Prof. Peter Erlinder [1] ________________________ “…if the Japanese had won the war, those of us who planned the fire-bombing of Tokyo would have been the war criminals….” [2] Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of State “…and so it goes…” [3] Billy Pilgrim (alter ego of an American prisoner of war, held in the cellar of a Dresden abattoir, who survived firebombing by his own troops, author Kurt Vonnegut Jr.) Introduction Unlike the postWW- II Tribunals, the U.N. Security Council tribunals for the former Yugoslavia [10] …

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Regulating Land Use In A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts Of Exactions, Mark Fenster Dec 2006

Regulating Land Use In A Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts Of Exactions, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

In a refreshingly clear and comprehensive decision issued towards the end of its 2004 Term, the Supreme Court explained in Lingle v. Chevron (2005) that the Takings Clause requires compensation only for the effects of a regulation on an individual’s property rights. Under the substantive due process doctrine, by contrast, courts engage in a deferential inquiry into both a regulation’s validity and the means by which the regulation attempts to meet the government’s objective. Lingle’s explanation appeared to cast doubt on the doctrinal foundation and reach of Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), …

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The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process Of Constitutional Property Rights, Mark Fenster Dec 2006

The Takings Clause, Version 2005: The Legal Process Of Constitutional Property Rights, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

The three takings decisions that the Supreme Court issued at the end of its October 2004 Term marked a stunning reversal of the Court’s efforts the past three decades to use the Takings Clause to define a set of constitutional property rights. The regulatory takings doctrine, which once loomed as a significant threat to the modern regulatory state, now appears after Lingle v. Chevron to be a relatively tame, if complicated, check on exceptional instances of regulatory abuse. At the same time, the Public Use Clause, formerly an inconsequential limitation on the state’s eminent domain authority, now appears ripe for …

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The Opacity Of Transparency, Mark Fenster Dec 2004

The Opacity Of Transparency, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

The normative concept of transparency, along with the open government laws that purport to create a transparent public system of governance promise the world—a democratic and accountable state above all, and a peaceful, prosperous, and efficient one as well. But transparency, in its role as the theoretical justification for a set of legal commands, frustrates all parties affected by its ambiguities and abstractions. The public’s engagement with transparency in practice yields denials of reasonable requests for essential government information, as well as government meetings that occur behind closed doors. Meanwhile, state officials bemoan the significantly impaired decision-making processes that result …

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Takings Formalism And Regulatory Formulas: Exactions And The Consequences Of Clarity, Mark Fenster Dec 2003

Takings Formalism And Regulatory Formulas: Exactions And The Consequences Of Clarity, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

A vocal minority of the U.S. Supreme Court recently announced its suspicion that lower courts and state and local administrative agencies are systematically ignoring constitutional rules intended to limit, through heightened judicial review, exactions as a land use regulatory tool. Exactions are the concessions local governments require of property owners as conditions for the issuance of the entitlements that enable the intensified use of real property. In two cases decided over the past two decades, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) and Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994), the Court has established under the Takings Clause a logic and metrics …

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The Birth Of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold And The Making Of Modern Administrative Law, Mark Fenster Dec 2003

The Birth Of A "Logical System": Thurman Arnold And The Making Of Modern Administrative Law, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Much of what we recognize as contemporary administrative law emerged during the 1920s and 1930s, a period when a group of legal academics attempted to aid Progressive Era and New Deal regulatory efforts by crafting a legitimating system for the federal administrative state. Their system assigned competent, expert institutions—most notably administrative agencies and the judiciary—well-defined roles: Agencies would utilize their vast, specialized knowledge and abilities to correct market failures, while courts would provide a limited but crucial oversight of agency operations. This Article focuses both on this first generation of administrative law scholarship, which included most prominently Felix Frankfurter and …

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Clueless: The Misuse Of Batf Firearms Tracing Data, David B. Kopel Dec 1998

Clueless: The Misuse Of Batf Firearms Tracing Data, David B. Kopel

David B Kopel

Sometimes the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms traces the registered sales history of a gun which was used in a crime, or which has been seized by the police. Traced guns are not representative of the broader universe of crime guns. Accordingly, drawing public policy conclusions based on tracing data is unwise.

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Legal Rhetoric And Revolutionary Change, Richard Kay Dec 1996

Legal Rhetoric And Revolutionary Change, Richard Kay

Richard Kay

If we define revolutionary change as the alteration of fundamental political arrangements in ways inconsistent with accepted understandings of law, we would not expect to find the invocation of law in justification of that change. In fact, however, such justification is not uncommon. This paper examines three cases exposing differing attitudes to legal justification of revolution-- the English Revolution of 1688-89, the secession of the Southern states at the beginning of the American Civil War and the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. In each case the paper describes the revolutionaries' use of legal language. It then shows how the use or …

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