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Book Review: The William Desmond Reader, Renee Köhler Ryan
Book Review: The William Desmond Reader, Renee Köhler Ryan
Renée Köhler-Ryan
This is a book review of The William Desmond Reader, edited by Christopher Ben Simpson. The review focuses on the ethical implications of Desmond's work, but places these in the broader context of his philosophy of the between, or metaxu.
Good Teaching, Spirituality And The Philosophy Of Emmanuel Levinas, Glenn J. Morrison
Good Teaching, Spirituality And The Philosophy Of Emmanuel Levinas, Glenn J. Morrison
Glenn J Morrison
The essay aims to show that nurturing a spirituality of good teaching could provide a more committed and responsible attitude towards education. Spirituality speaks of relationships, the search for meaning and, in Levinasian terms, having a heart for another. Students demand that teachers should be many things such as passionate, engaging, intelligent, fun, challenging, fair and creative. The more we can develop meaning and a spirituality in teaching, the more we may meet these demands and also attend to the students’ enthusiasm, frustration, uncertainty, impatience, fears and dreams. Part I of the essay will explore some Levinasian-inspired ways how spirituality …
Under The Veil, William Simkulet
The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet
The Deontic Cycling Problem, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
In his recent article "Deontic Cycling and the Structure of Commonsense Morality," Tim Willenken argues that commonsense ethics allows for rational agents having both ranked reasons (A > B, B > C, and A > C) and cyclical reasons (A < B, B < C, and A > C). His goal is to show that not all plausible views are variations of consequentialism, as consequentialism requires ranked reasons. I argue instances of apparent deontic cycling in commonsense morality are the byproducts of incomplete characterizations of the cases in question.
The Compensation Principle, William Simkulet
The Compensation Principle, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
In "Should Race Matter?," David Boonin proposes the compensation principle: When an agent wrongfully harms another person, she incurs a moral obligation to compensate that person for the harms she has caused. Boonin then argues that the United States government has wrongfully harmed black Americans by adopting pro-slavery laws and other discriminatory laws and practices following the end of slavery, and therefore the United States government has an obligation to pay reparations for slavery and discriminatory laws and practices to those who have been harmed by them - in particular, to contemporary black Americans. Here I argue that the compensation …
On Robust Alternate Possibilities And The Tax Evasion Case, William Simkulet
On Robust Alternate Possibilities And The Tax Evasion Case, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
In his recent article “Defending Hard Incompatibilism Again,” Pereboom (2008) presents what he calls the “Tax Evasion” case, a Frankfurt-style case designed to show the falsity of the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP). According to Pereboom, PAP requires robust alternate possibilities such that an agent could have acted in a manner in which she knew she would have lacked moral responsibility for her actions. However, according to his “Tax Evasion” case, the tax evader lacks such robust alternate possibilities, and yet is still uncontroversially morally responsible for his actions. Here I argue Pereboom’s account of robust alternate possibilities is deficient, …
Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet
Moral And Professional Accountability For Clinical Ethics Consultants, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
No abstract provided.
In Control, William Simkulet
In Control, William Simkulet
William Simkulet
In George Sher’s recent article “Out of Control”, he discusses a series of 9 cases that he believes illustrates that some agents are uncontroversially morally responsible for actions they “cannot help” but perform (2006: 285). He argues these agents exert partial control over these actions insofar as their actions are determined from their character; but this is no control at all. Here I argue that in each of these cases the agent exerts morally relevant control over her actions and that none of these are genuine instances of moral luck, nor counterexamples to the control principle.
Reproductive Autonomy In Light Of Responsible Parenthood, Hille Haker
Reproductive Autonomy In Light Of Responsible Parenthood, Hille Haker
Hille Haker
No abstract provided.
Empirie Und Ethik, In: Empirie Und Ethik, Freiburg I.Br., Hille Haker