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How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
Spencer Weber Waller
No abstract provided.
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
How Much Of Health Care Antitrust Is Really Antitrust?, Spencer Weber Waller
Faculty Publications & Other Works
No abstract provided.
Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage
Assembled Products: The Key To More Effective Competition And Antitrust Oversight In Health Care, William M. Sage
Faculty Scholarship
This Article argues that recent calls for antitrust enforcement to protect health insurers from hospital and physician consolidation are incomplete. The principal obstacle to effective competition in health care is not that one or the other party has too much bargaining power, but that they have been buying and selling the wrong things. Vigorous antitrust enforcement will benefit health care consumers only if it accounts for the competitive distortions caused by the sector’s long history of government regulation. Because of regulation, what pass for products in health care are typically small process steps and isolated components that can be assigned …
Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance
Licensing Health Care Professionals, State Action And Antitrust Policy, Roger D. Blair, Christine Piette Durrance
UF Law Faculty Publications
In this Essay, we raise some economic concerns about the wisdom of conferring antitrust immunity on professional licensing boards, which are often comprised of members of the profession and therefore apt to be motivated by self-interest rather than the public interest. In Part II, we examine the political economy of special interest legislation, which suggests that little public good results from replacing competitive market forces with self-regulation. In Part III, we employ a basic economic model to generate predictions of the economic effects of professional licensing. Part IV provides a survey of the empirical research in this area, which confirms …