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Antitrust and Trade Regulation

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University of Mary Washington

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Presidential Influence On The Bureaucracy: The Curious Case Of Lina Khan, Nickolas Remish May 2024

Presidential Influence On The Bureaucracy: The Curious Case Of Lina Khan, Nickolas Remish

Student Research Submissions

How effective can a president be in promoting his or her policies through the bureaucracy? Most theories postulate the president has influence – via appointees, budgeting, and executive orders. This paper unpacks the president’s influence on the bureaucracy by analyzing President Biden’s effect on antitrust, particularly with regards to addressing labor concerns. Biden appears to depart from previous presidential administrations due to his heightened emphasis on labor’s need for protection and antitrust law as the optimal vehicle for helping workers. The data, pulled from federal and state court antitrust cases since 2000, relies on textual analysis with regards to the …


State Antitrust Enforcement: Politics Or Economics?, Nickolas Remish May 2024

State Antitrust Enforcement: Politics Or Economics?, Nickolas Remish

Student Research Submissions

Antitrust enforcement on the federal level has clear partisan influences; Democrats usually support expansive enforcement regimes while Republicans oppose them. On the state level, the ideological divide appears muddled. State attorneys general, who are mostly elected officials, are responsible for initiating lawsuits. This study seeks to determine whether state attorneys general mirror their federal counterpart in enforcing antitrust law on a partisan basis or whether unique state variables such as economic factors overwhelm ideological motivations. Public choice theory dictates politicians prioritize re-election and will adhere to constituent interest, thus providing the theoretical foundation for why politicians may tailor antitrust enforcement …