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Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Innovation And Optimal Punishment, With Antitrust Applications, Keith N. Hylton, Haizhen Lin
Faculty Scholarship
This article modifies the optimal punishment analysis by incorporating investment incentives with external benefits. In the models examined, the recommendation that the optimal penalty should internalize the marginal social harm is no longer valid. We focus on antitrust applications. In light of the benefits from innovation, the optimal policy will punish monopolizing firms more leniently than suggested in the standard static model. It may be optimal not to punish the monopolizing firm at all, or to reward the firm rather than punish it. We examine the precise balance between penalty and reward in the optimal punishment scheme.
Notes On Trademark Monopolies, Wendy J. Gordon, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Notes On Trademark Monopolies, Wendy J. Gordon, Glynn S. Lunney Jr.
Scholarship Chronologically
Since 1742, when Lord Hardwicke seemingly equated trademark protection with monopoly in one of the first trademark cases, until the mid- 1950s, concerns that trademarks represented a form of illegitimate monopoly effectively constrained the growth of trademark protection. In the twentieth century, Edward Chamberlain became the leading proponent of the trademark as monopoly view with the publication of his work, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition, in 1933. In his work, Chamberlain argued that a trademark enabled its owner to differentiate her products and then to exclude others from using the differentiating feature. By doing so, trademark protection can effectively …