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Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
Short-Circuiting The New Major Questions Doctrine, Kent H. Barnett, Christopher J. Walker
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In Minor Courts, Major Questions, Michael Coenen and Seth Davis advance perhaps the most provocative proposal to date to address the new major questions doctrine articulated in King v. Burwell. They argue that the Supreme Court alone should identify “major questions” that deprive agencies of interpretive primacy, prohibiting the doctrine’s use in the lower courts. Although we agree that the Court provided little guidance about the doctrine’s scope in King v. Burwell, we are unpersuaded that the solution to this lack of guidance is to limit its doctrinal development to one court that hears fewer than eighty cases per year. …
Beyond Absurd: Jim Thorpe And A Proposed Taxonomy For The Absurdity Doctrine, Hillel Y. Levin, Joshua M. Segal, Keisha N. Stanford
Beyond Absurd: Jim Thorpe And A Proposed Taxonomy For The Absurdity Doctrine, Hillel Y. Levin, Joshua M. Segal, Keisha N. Stanford
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In light of the Third Circuit's recent decision interpreting the Native American Graves Repatriation Act, this Article argues that the Supreme Court must clarify the Absurdity Doctrine of statutory interpretation. The Article offers a framework for doing so.
Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett
Improving Agencies’ Preemption Expertise With Chevmore Codification, Kent H. Barnett
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After nearly thirty years, the judicially crafted Chevron and Skidmore judicial-review doctrines have found new life as exotic, yet familiar, legislative tools. When Chevron deference applies, courts employ two steps: they consider whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous, and, if so, they defer to an administering agency’s reasonable interpretation. Skidmore deference, in contrast, is a less deferential regime in which courts assume interpretative primacy over statutory ambiguities but defer to agency action based on four factors — the agency’s thoroughness, reasoning, consistency, and overall persuasiveness. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Congress directed courts …
The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White
The Stare Decisis "Exception" To The Chevron Deference Rule, Rebecca White
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In this article, the author discusses how Chevron intersects with one important competing norm - stare decisis. Stare decisis counsels the Court to adhere to its own decisions, particularly statutory ones, absent substantial justification for departure. To what extent should stare decisis apply when an agency's interpretation of a statute, otherwise deserving of deference under Chevron, conflicts with a prior interpretation of the statute by the Supreme Court?
This article suggests the following answer: If the Court's prior opinion upheld the agency's interpretation as one reasonable reading of the statute, but not the only one possible, and the agency thereafter …