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When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process Of Administrative Lawmaking, Evan J. Criddle
When Delegation Begets Domination: Due Process Of Administrative Lawmaking, Evan J. Criddle
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
"Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control Of Administrative Power, David S. Rubenstein
"Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control Of Administrative Power, David S. Rubenstein
William & Mary Law Review
Administrative agencies wield a necessary but dangerous power. Some control of that power is constitutionally required and normatively justified. Yet widely discordant views persist concerning the appropriate means of control. Scholars have proposed competing administrative control models that variably place the judiciary, the President, and Congress at the helm. Although these models offer critical insights into the institutional competencies of the respective branches, they tend to understate the limitations of those branches to check administrative power and ultimately marginalize the public interest costs occasioned by second-guessing administrative choice. The “relative checks” paradigm introduced here seeks to improve upon existing models …
Who Should Regulate? Federalism And Conflict In Regulation Of Green Buildings, Shari Shapiro
Who Should Regulate? Federalism And Conflict In Regulation Of Green Buildings, Shari Shapiro
William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review
No abstract provided.
Democratizing The Administrative State, Richard J. Pierce Jr.
Democratizing The Administrative State, Richard J. Pierce Jr.
William & Mary Law Review
Scholars have long questioned the political and constitutional legitimacy of the administrative state. By 1980, a majority of Supreme Court Justices seemed poised to hold that large portions of the administrative state are unconstitutional. In 1984, the Court retreated from that abyss and took a major step toward legitimating and democratizing the administrative state. It instructed lower courts to defer to any reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous agency-administered statute, basing this doctrine of deference on the superior political accountability of agencies. Henceforth, politically unaccountable judges were prohibited from substituting their policy preferences for those of politically accountable agencies. The …