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Localist Administrative Law, Nestor M. Davidson Jan 2017

Localist Administrative Law, Nestor M. Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

To read the voluminous literature on administrative law is to inhabit a world focused almost exclusively on federal agencies. This myopic view, however, ignores the wide array of administrative bodies that make and implement policy at the local-government level. The administrative law that emerges from the vast subterranean regulatory state operating within cities, suburbs, towns, and counties has gone largely unexamined. Not only are scholars ignoring a key area of governance, but courts have similarly failed to develop an administrative jurisprudence that recognizes what is distinctive about local agencies. The underlying justifications for core administrative law doctrines at the federal …


Resetting The Baseline Of Ownership: Takings And Investor Expectations After The Bailouts, Nestor M. Davidson Jan 2016

Resetting The Baseline Of Ownership: Takings And Investor Expectations After The Bailouts, Nestor M. Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

During the economic crisis that began in 2008, the federal government nationalized several of the nation’s most significant private companies as part of a broad effort to forestall a global depression. Shareholders in those companies later filed suit, alleging that the federal government in so doing—and in subsequent actions while in control of the firms—took their property without compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. To date, those claims have not succeeded. If these cases continue on their current trajectory, with courts rejecting arguments that the rescue of systematically important firms on the brink of collapse requires compensation for shareholders, …


The Legitimacy Of Administrative Law, Jed H. Shugerman Jan 2015

The Legitimacy Of Administrative Law, Jed H. Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Reviewing Daniel R. Ernst, Tocqueville’s Nightmare: The Administrative State Emerges in America, 1900-1940; Joanna Grisinger, The Unwieldy American State: Administrative Politics Since the New Deal; Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful?; Jerry L. Mashaw, Creating the Administrative Constitution: The Lost One Hundred Years of American Administrative Law; and Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Profit Motive: The Salary Revolution in American Government, 1780-1940.


Regleprudence – At Oira And Beyond, Nestor M. Davidson, Ethan J. Leib Jan 2015

Regleprudence – At Oira And Beyond, Nestor M. Davidson, Ethan J. Leib

Faculty Scholarship

There are significant domains of legality within the administrative state that are mostly immune from judicial review and have mostly escaped the attention of legal theorists. While administrative law generally focuses on the products of agency action as they are reviewed by the judiciary, there are important aspects of regulatory activity that are legal or law-like but rarely interrogated by systematic analysis with reference to accounts about the role and nature of law. In this Article, we introduce a category of analysis we call "regleprudence," a sibling of jurisprudence and legisprudence. Once we explore some regleprudential norms, we delve into …


The Creation Of The Department Of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights Or Civil Service, Jed H. Shugerman Jan 2014

The Creation Of The Department Of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights Or Civil Service, Jed H. Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

This Article offers a new interpretation of the founding of the Department of Justice in 1870 as an effort to shrink and professionalize the federal government. The traditional view is that Congress created the DOJ to increase the federal government’s capacity to litigate a growing docket as a result of the Civil War, and more recent scholarship contends that Congress created the DOJ to enforce Reconstruction and ex-slaves’ civil rights. However, it has been overlooked that the DOJ bill eliminated about one third of federal legal staff. The founding of the DOJ had less to do with Reconstruction, and more …


Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security And The Administrative State, Joseph Landau Jan 2013

Chevron Meets Youngstown: National Security And The Administrative State, Joseph Landau

Faculty Scholarship

The past several years have witnessed a burst of scholarship at the intersection of national security and administrative law. Many supporters of this approach endorse a heightened, “super-strong” brand of Chevron deference to presidential decisionmaking during times of emergency. Believing that the Executive’s comparative advantage in expertise, access to information, and accountability warrant minimal judicial scrutiny, these Chevron-backers advance an Executive-centric view of national security powers. Other scholars, by contrast, dispute Chevron’s relevance to national security. These Chevron-detractors argue for an interventionist judiciary in national security matters. Both camps criticize the Supreme Court’s scaling of deference to the Executive after …


Accountability And The Bureau Of Consumer Financial Protection, Susan Block-Lieb Jan 2012

Accountability And The Bureau Of Consumer Financial Protection, Susan Block-Lieb

Faculty Scholarship

Some industry and political actors oppose the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) on the grounds that its institutional design ensures its lack of accountability. Specifically, opponents point to the CFPB’s regulatory and financial independence and to the fact that a single director heads the Bureau rather than a bipartisan panel of commissioners. But to focus on the Bureau’s financial independence and single director misses the distinctive political deal struck when Congress created the CFPB. The CFPB has been uniquely and intentionally structured to insulate it not only from interest group influence and executive interference, but also from congressional control, while …


Isolated And Politicized: The Nlrb's Uncertain Future The National Labor Relations Board In Comparative Context: Introduction, James J. Brudney Jan 2004

Isolated And Politicized: The Nlrb's Uncertain Future The National Labor Relations Board In Comparative Context: Introduction, James J. Brudney

Faculty Scholarship

The National Labor Relations Board has managed to remain unusually detached or isolated in its decision-making even as it has come to operate in an openly partisan manner. There is a certain paradoxical quality to the coexistence of these two descriptors for Board conduct: isolation in agency performance ordinarily suggests a neutral separation from the political process whereas politicization implies a close connection to the elected branches. The explanation for this odd pairing involves a number of factors: some reflect political realities beyond the agency's ability to control, others relate to the structure of the NLRA, and still others are …


Adjudicative Retroactivity In Administrative Law , Abner S. Greene Jan 1991

Adjudicative Retroactivity In Administrative Law , Abner S. Greene

Faculty Scholarship

Although decided forty-five years ago, SEC v Cbenery Corp. ("Cbenery II") remains the Supreme Court's leading statement on the issue of retroactivity in administrative adjudication. According to Chenery II, administrative agencies may give meaning to statutory terms through adjudication, even if the rules applied in a particular adjudication have not been previously announced. The Court acknowledged that "announcing and applying a new standard of conduct" in an adjudicative proceeding would have a retroactive effect, but concluded that the agency's duty to be faithful to the "statutory design or to legal and equitable principles" may override concerns about retroactivity. The Court …


There May Be Cracks In The Foundation: An Analysis Of Pennsylvania's Current Approach To Legislative Review Of Agency Rulemaking , Nicholas J. Johnson Jan 1989

There May Be Cracks In The Foundation: An Analysis Of Pennsylvania's Current Approach To Legislative Review Of Agency Rulemaking , Nicholas J. Johnson

Faculty Scholarship

As the legislative delegation of power to administrative agencies has grown over recent decades, so have calls for controls on agencies exercise of that power and particularly for controls on agency rulemaking. In response, various state legislatures have introduced a myriad of designs introducing legislative oversight and control over administrative regulations. Pennsylvania has joined these states by offering a means of legislative review of agency rulemaking in the form of the Regulatory Review Act of 1989 (Act 19). Pursuant to the Act, the Pennsylvania Legislature created an entity called the Independent Regulatory Review Commission and assigned to the Commission the …