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423,093 full-text articles. Page 3 of 9617.

Informal Discussion, Todd DeRose 2020 Western University

Informal Discussion, Todd Derose

Western E-Vent in Early Modern Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Commentary On: Christina Pontoppidan’S “Where Do You Place Your Argument? The Toulmin Model Revisited And Revised From A Rhetorical Perspective”, Manfred E. Kraus 2020 University of Tübingen

Commentary On: Christina Pontoppidan’S “Where Do You Place Your Argument? The Toulmin Model Revisited And Revised From A Rhetorical Perspective”, Manfred E. Kraus

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Petar Bodlović: "Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations", David Godden 2020 Philosophy, Michigan State University

Commentary On Petar Bodlović: "Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations", David Godden

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God, Kenneth Pearce 2020 Western University

Does Berkeley Anthropomorphize God, Kenneth Pearce

Western E-Vent in Early Modern Philosophy

Berkeley occasionally says that we use analogy in thinking and speaking of God (Alc, §4.21). However, the scholarly consensus is that Berkeley rejects the traditional doctrine of divine analogy and holds instead that words like ‘wise’ apply to God in precisely the same way as they apply to Socrates. The difference is only a matter of degree (Daniel 2011; Curtin 2014; Pearce 2018; Fasko 2018). Univocal theories of the divine attributes have historically been charged with anthropomorphism—that is, with imagining God to be too similar to human beings (see Maimonides, Guide, ch. 1.1). Can Berkeley fairly be ...


Where Do You Place Your Argument?, Christina Pontoppidan 2020 University of Southern Denmark

Where Do You Place Your Argument?, Christina Pontoppidan

OSSA Conference Archive

Toulmin’s logical approach to argumentation affects the purpose and design of his argument model. The author argues that, even though the model has proven useful and influential in the rhetorical tradition, it misses the most central aspects of persuasive argumentation and the rhetorical role of the topics. The author outlines a rhetorical argument model that takes the metaphor of places seriously and shows the process of building a persuasive argument guided by different types of topical places.


Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski 2020 Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Metalinguistic Disagreements, Underdetermination And The Straw Man Fallacy: Toward Meaning Argumentativism, Marcin Lewinski

OSSA Conference Archive

The goal of this paper is to critically analyze some of the dubious assumptions about language and meaning hidden in the dominant accounts of the straw man fallacy. I will argue that against the background of the resurgent conception of language as an underdetermined and in-principle negotiable entity (Dorr & Hawthorne 2014; Ludlow 2014; Plunkett & Sundell 2013, 2019), some alleged straw man attacks are better seen as reasonable moves in the metalinguistic disagreements permeating our ordinary argumentative practice.


Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations, Petar Bodlović 2020 Faculty of Philosophy (Department of Theoretical Philosophy), University of Groningen, The Netherlands

Presumptions, Burdens Of Proof, And Explanations, Petar Bodlović

OSSA Conference Archive

On the standard view, all types of presumptions share the same deontic function: they asymmetrically allocate the burden of proof. In this paper, I take into account the differences between cognitive and practical presumptions and explore the deontic function in some detail. What, exactly, does the deontic function of presumption amount to? Once presumptions are rejected, do they always place the burden of proof on the opponents? If they do, what does the burden of proof amount to; and, if they do not, what other obligations might be relevant? Do presumptions place the burden of arguing, the burden of explanation ...


Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach 2020 University of Windsor

Piggybacking In? A Critical Discourse Analysis Of Argumentation Schemes, Harmony Peach

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, Douglas Walton’s Argumentation Schemes and corresponding critical questions are taken through Thomas Huckin’s (1997) Critical Discourse Analysis in order to further demonstrate that a schematic-pragmatic approach to argument evaluation needs to account for bias in and of itself. Building on the work of Audrey Yap (2013, 2015) and Ciurria and Al Tamini (2014) which demonstrates how the schemes have not addressed, and may even intensify, various disadvantages people with systemic identity prejudices face, Huckin’s approach offers additional nuance as to how these concerns can be exacerbated by the schemes. As the schemes have been ...


Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong 2020 East China University of Political Science and Law, Wenbo Academy

Between Evidence And Facts: An Argumentative Perspective Of Legal Evidence, Wenjing Du, Minghui Xiong

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, we will present an argumentative view of legal evidence. In an argumentation-based litigation game, the only purpose of the suitor (S) or the respondent (R) is to maximize their own legal rights while the purpose of the trier (T) is to maintain judicial fairness and justice. Different selections of evidence and different orders of presenting evidence will lead to different case-facts and even adjudicative results, the purpose of litigation is to reconcile a balance among the three parties - S, R, and T.


Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta 2020 Universidade Nova de Lisboa

Coding Empathy, Fabrizio Macagno, Chrysi Rapanta

OSSA Conference Archive

The possibility of dialogue is rooted in the fundamental and basic capacity of understanding the interlocutor’s utterances – and more importantly, positions. As pointed out in the literature (Gilbert 1997; Buber 1999[1957]), understanding involves adopting the worldview of the other, which includes his or her values, emotions, and other background assumptions. This constraint on understanding leads to a problem: how is it possible to understand the other in a dialogue, when the only access to his or her worldview is the dialogue itself?

In the rhetorical tradition, the notion of empathy has always been considered as the crucial bridge ...


Commentary On Jens Kjeldsen’S “What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Everyday Life?”, Harry Weger Jr. 2020 University of Central Florida

Commentary On Jens Kjeldsen’S “What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Everyday Life?”, Harry Weger Jr.

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary On Yun Xie's "The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered", Derek Allen 2020 University of Toronto

Commentary On Yun Xie's "The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered", Derek Allen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Connectives And Straw Men. Experimental Approach On French And English., Jennifer Schumann, Sandrine Zufferey 2020 University of Berne

Connectives And Straw Men. Experimental Approach On French And English., Jennifer Schumann, Sandrine Zufferey

OSSA Conference Archive

In this paper, we present experiments designed to assess the role of causal connectives with an attributive meaning (e.g. since and puisque ) on the acceptability of straw man fallacies. Our results show that connectives play a role for the detection of straw man fallacies by increasing readers’ awareness to the speaker’s persuasive intent, thus creating a forewarning effect. We also uncover a crucial difference between causal connectives both within and across languages. Taken together, our experiments plead in favor of conducting fine-grained analyses of connectives in different languages in order to deepen our understanding of their role for ...


What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Our Everyday Life? Working Through Evidence And Persuasion, Events And Experiences., Jens E. Kjeldsen 2020 University of Bergen, Department of Information Science and Media Studies

What Makes Us Change Our Minds In Our Everyday Life? Working Through Evidence And Persuasion, Events And Experiences., Jens E. Kjeldsen

OSSA Conference Archive

We know almost nothing about the reasoning that makes people change their minds in everyday life. Which role do arguments play in contrast to personal relations and ethos? Are people persuaded to change, or does change rather follow personal experiences? This paper examines the epistemologies people use to rhetorically work through their opinions, when moving from one conviction to another. The paper is based on research interviews with people who have changed their minds.


The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered, Robert Xie 2020 University of Windsor

The Notion Of On-Balance Premise Reconsidered, Robert Xie

OSSA Conference Archive

The notion of on-balance premise has played a crucial role in understanding the structure of conduction. It is a widely accepted view that in any third-pattern conductive argument there is always an implicit on-balance premise which represents a judgment that the positive reasons for the conclusion have outweighed the counter-considerations against it. This paper aims to provide a critical examination of the notion, and to reveal its inadequacy as a theoretical tool. First, it argues that the notion of on-balance premise has rested upon a metaphor of outweighing that is too simplistic to characterize the weighing and balancing between reasons ...


Day 3 Schedule, Benjamin Hill 2020 Western

Day 3 Schedule, Benjamin Hill

Western E-Vent in Early Modern Philosophy

No abstract provided.


Comments On Wagemans' "Argument Levers", Hans Vilhelm Hansen 2020 University of Windsor

Comments On Wagemans' "Argument Levers", Hans Vilhelm Hansen

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Commentary: Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer 2020 University of Siena

Commentary: Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer 2020 University of Siena

Automated Argument Analysis – Comment On: Mizrahi & Dickinson: "Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study", Christoph Lumer

OSSA Conference Archive

No abstract provided.


Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study, Moti Mizrahi, Michael Dickinson 2020 Florida Institute of Technology - Melbourne

Argumentation In Philosophical Practice: An Empirical Study, Moti Mizrahi, Michael Dickinson

OSSA Conference Archive

Philosophers tend to think of themselves as model arguers and that the best kind of argument is deductive arguments, i.e., the most persuasive arguments where the premises provide the best evidence for conclusions. This raises the question: Do philosophers make the best type of arguments? If deductive arguments are indeed the best, and philosophers are model arguers, is it the case that philosophers make deductive arguments significantly more than other kinds of argument? We set out to investigate this question empirically. Using data mining and text analysis methods, we study a large corpus of philosophical texts mined from the ...


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